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Abstract

Serfdom in Russia has often been viewed in Anglo-U.S. historiography as an
exceptional institution in that it emerged in the early-modern age, after serfdom in
Western Europe had ended, and that it persisted for well over two centuries, spanning the
Muscovite and the Imperial eras. Many historians have thus compared serfdom in Russia
unfavorably to labor systems that developed in Western European nations at that time,
considered to be “modern” and “free,” in contrast to the “unfree” labor obtained through
Russian serfdom. This thesis presents the scholars who take this view, and refers to them
as “Consensus Historians,” as their works are seminal and their influence is even now
far-reaching. In addition to depicting Russian serfdom as a type of “unfree” labor similar
to slavery, Consensus Historians maintain that the persistence of serfdom in Russia was
interconnected with the “backwardness” of Russian society. The view of the Consensus
Historians, who were generally active in the 1960s-1970s, has been challenged by more
recent scholars, whom this chapter calls “Revisionist Historians.” Using archival material
not available to the Consensus Historians, as they belonged to the Anglo-U.S. side of the
Cold War divide, the “Revisionists” question many of the assumptions underlying the
argument of the Consensus authors, as well as their depiction of serfdom. Examining
court cases, records of landed estates where enserfed peasants lived and worked, and
other archival documents, the Revisionist authors argue that serfdom was in practice an
institution that changed over the years, varied vastly depending on location and time, and
was far less monolithic and inflexible than has been depicted by previous historians. The
first two chapters deal with the claims of these two groups of authors. The third chapter
i

explores contemporary works that give voice to the experiences of the enserfed peasants,
including several serf memoirs. This chapter gives the reader an opportunity to square the
life experiences portrayed by the memoirs with the claims from the Consensus and
Revisionist authors. Finally, the fourth chapter will take a step back from the Russian
Empire and look at labor systems elsewhere in the long nineteenth-century world, a time
of expanding world markets and sharply growing labor needs. This chapter compares and
contrasts to the Russian case a variety of “free” and “un-free” labor systems that took
hold around the world in this time, and aims to determine whether serfdom in Russia was
uniquely or exceptionally “unfree” in an era when a wide range of coercive labor
practices existed, supported by powerful Western countries and affecting millions and
generations of laborers.
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INTRODUCTION
Serfdom emerged in Muscovite Russia around the sixteenth century. It was
entrenched by Muscovite legal code in the seventeenth century, extended to new
territories by the young Russian Empire in the early eighteenth century, and continued to
exist for another century and a half before it was finally abolished by Tsar Alexander II in
1861. The permanent codification of serfdom is considered by many historians to be
marked by the 1649 Law Code, which prohibited the movement of serfs from the estates
of their landowners. Serfdom in Russia lasted 212 years, from the end of the Muscovite
period to the modern era. Because of the lateness of this timeframe, as serfdom in the
larger European context is often viewed as a medieval institution, serfdom in Russia is
also referred to as the “second serfdom.” For many historians, comparing Russian
historical development to that of Western Europe, Russia’s “second serfdom” was an
anomaly, and the reason for the empire’s backwardness relative to other parts of Europe.
This thesis project is a historiographical analysis that examines how historians
have interpreted the serfdom in the Russian Empire, as well as the significance of their
interpretations. In the thesis, I will refer to the historians who have shaped the study of
Russian serfdom, and who have contributed to the still predominant interpretation of the
subject as “Consensus” historians. Their understanding of serfdom in Russia has recently
been challenged by historians whom I will call “Revisionist.” This project will first
survey the understanding of serfdom in Russia presented by Consensus historians who
tend to look to Western Europe as the model of social and economic progress and often
equate serfdom with slavery. This will be Chapter I.
1

Chapter II will examine the work of the Revisionist scholars, who suggest a
different approach to interpreting serfdom in Russia. The Revisionist scholars raise
questions about the equivalence of serfdom and slavery, and diverge from the Consensus
interpretation that serfdom constituted a central mark of Russian economic backwardness
in comparison to Western Europe. The Revisionists also challenge the Consensus views
of the Russian state’s agency in maintaining the institution of serfdom.
In Chapter III I will assess the cogency of these two differing schools of
interpretation in relation to the experience of the serfs themselves, as told in
contemporary accounts. Using primary sources such as serf memoirs, this chapter will
highlight the strength and weaknesses of these two groups of divergent interpretations.
Chapter IV will assess how these conclusions drawn from the Russian case presented in
the previous chapter might assist the study of labor extraction in the global context.
Consensus Historians
This chapter will present the literature produced by historians of Russian serfdom
who provide the foundational studies of the topic. The work of these historians, whom I
call “Consensus” Historians, explain the emergence of serfdom in Muscovy, how it
worked and why it endured for centuries in the Russian Empire.
According to the Consensus Historians the free movement of peasants became an
increasing concern to the Muscovite state as it consolidated power through war. Over two
centuries, restrictions on the movement of peasants gradually shifted from temporary
bans to extended prohibitions culminating in the Law Codes of 1649, which permanently
2

bound the resident peasants to the land they occupied. The state, according to these
historians, deprived peasants of the freedom of movement to ensure a labor force for its
servitors, who were largely members of the military and civil service elite, in short, the
nobility.
Legally bound to the lands granted by the state to the nobility, formerly free
peasants, now serfs, were also legally required to pay for their use of the land they lived
on by furnishing either labor or rent to their landlords. The labor due was called
barshchina, which was never legally codified but was generally accepted as three days a
week. Obrok was the equivalent of barshchina, paid in kind or in cash, and was more
common in labor dues in less agriculturally productive regions. This arrangement
between the serfs and the nobles provided an economic base of revenue for the nobility.
The Consensus Historians describe the state, in enserfing peasants, as ceding to
the estate owners its jurisdiction over the stratum peasants now bonded to the estates.1 In
fact, the Consensus historians suggest the state willingly converted millions of peasants
to the status of serfs because it looked to the nobility for policing the peasants. As a
result, according to the Consensus view, the enserfed peasants were left without recourse
to legal protection from the state, a position that in practice transformed the serfs’ status
to that similar to a personal possession of the landlords, and that effectively erased the
difference between serfs and slaves.2

1

Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1961): 422.
2
Richard Hellie, Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971):
145.
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Gauging the significance of serfdom in Russia, Consensus Historians often view
Russia as lagging behind Western Europe in economics and political development, and
saw serfdom as a major contributing factor to Russian “backwardness.” Alexander
Gerschenkron notably argues that the energy and productivity of the peasantry was
diverted from potential economic expansion, and instead directed towards unproductive
obligation to the nobility.3 Jerome Blum agrees with Gerschenkron that serfdom was an
institution that slowed agricultural innovation and inhibited the economic growth
potential of imperial Russia.4
Revisionist Historians
Whereas the Consensus authors describe the state’s involvement in the affairs of
the enserfed peasantry as mainly intervening on the behalf of the landowners, the
Revisionist authors highlight the state’s continued presence in adjudicating enserfed
peasants’ obligations to estate owners, and in regulating the relationship between
landowners and serfs. The Revisionist’s thus challenge the Consensus Historians’ view
that the state simply gave in with regard to the demands of the landlords and ceased to
consider the governance of serfs its responsibility. The Revisionists, to demonstrate the
state’s continued presence in the jurisdiction of enserfed peasants, point to many
examples of state intervention on behalf of the serfs in the serf-landowner relationship.

3

Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962):
4
Blum, Lord and Peasant, 612-13.
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The Revisionist scholars this thesis will examine include David Moon,
Alessandro Stanziani, T.K. Dennison, and Thomas Esper. David Moon describes the
Russian state as actively promoting the welfare of the serfs by setting legal expectations
for the landowners to provide for their serfs’ subsistence during times of famine or bad
harvests. A 1734 law required landowners to feed their serfs in times of need and to
provide them with seed stock. Successive bad harvests led the state to require landlords to
set aside reserve granaries. Another important way that the state involved itself in
regulating the institution of serfdom was by protecting the serfs from economic ruin or
over-exploitation by landowners. The ultimate sanction from the state was to confiscate
the estate of an abusive landlord and to transfer it to a trustee or family member. Between
1834 and 1846, there were 2,838 cases involving the mistreatment of serfs, with 630
convictions.5
The state, according to Alessandro Stanziani, did not completely abdicate its
authority over the serfs and surrender it to the landowners. Between the seventeenth and
the nineteenth century, Russian estate owners at times published their own instructions or
edicts for the governance of their estates, which were meant to “provide a list of rules in
place in a given estate.” But, Stanziani states, these instructions had to be enforced by the
state or they worked in conjunction with the laws of the state. Allowing estate owners to
issue their own edicts and instructions, according to Stanziani, testifies not to the ceding
of the tsarist state’s authority to govern serfs, “but rather to [its efforts to] decentralize the

5

David Moon, “Reassessing Russian Serfdom,” European History Quarterly 26, no.4 (1996): 504-505.
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production and the application of the rules pertaining to it.” 6 Stanziani asserts that,
ultimately, the tsarist state had the right to intervene in the affairs of any estate, and had
the power to remove a landlord’s authority for any reason.
Showing that serfdom in Russia was a more flexible institution than that
suggested by Consensus Historians, T.K. Dennison points to private estate instructions
that at times worked in conjunction with the existing law of the state to broaden the scope
of serfs’ economic activity. Dennison studies a set of these instructions from the
Voshchazhnikovo estate owned by the Sheremet’ev family. Dennison states that on the
whole the detailed and uniform instructions issued by the Sheremet’ev estates’ central
office of managers and administrators benefitted the serfs. The study demonstrates that
estate owners and their serfs often bypassed legal obstacles placed by the state, by way of
arrangement that enabled serfs to gain, in the owner’s name, access to land, right to
property, and participation in credit markets. The instructions and the central managerial
administrations of the Sheremet’ev estates provided the serfs with a certain degree of
legal recognition outside of the peasant commune, and assisted in establishing contract
enforcement for serfs.7 By describing some of the laws that the landlords had to work
around, sometimes for the benefit of their serfs, as in the case of the Voshchazhnikovo
estate, Dennison demonstrates that the state was very much present in the legal dealings
that involved serfs in these private estates.

6

Alessandro Stanziani, “Revisiting Russian Serfdom: Bonded Peasants and Market Dynamics, 1600s1800s” International Labor and Working Class History 78, no. 1 (2010): 17.
7
T. K. Dennison, “Did Serfdom Matter? Russian Rural Society, 1750-1860,” Historical Research 70, no. 203.
(2006): 77.
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Consensus authors, in addition to stating the equivalence of slavery
(understanding slavery as the ownership of people by individuals) and serfdom in Russia,
also generally describe serfs in Russia as poor, and living at subsistence levels, thus
reflecting the general economic backwardness of Russia. Thomas Esper rebukes this view
in a study of Russian industrial serfs who lived and worked, sometimes for generations,
in the Ural region where the metallurgical industry was concentrated. Esper uses the
archives for the Demidov industrial operations dating from the 1800s to show that
workers’ conditions there compared favorably to those of contemporary industrial
workers in Western Europe and Great Britain. Using data from an 1850s commission for
developing Russia’s iron industry, Esper demonstrates that there was a correlation
between the degree of prosperity of an industrial enterprise in Russia and the lot of its
workers, Esper also shows that many Russian industrial serfs enjoyed a degree of
economic stability and a standard of living comparable to their counterparts in the less
“backward nations.”8
This chapter will examine the argument of the authors mentioned above, as well
as of other Revisionist Historians. The next chapter will offer an evaluation of their
persuasiveness.
Serfdom in Serf Memoirs and Other Writings
This chapter will draw on memoirs and other contemporary accounts to assess
how well Consensus and Revisionist interpretations reflect the experience and capture the
8

Thomas Esper, "The Condition of the Serf Workers in Russia's Metallurgical Industry, 1800-1861," Journal
of Modern History 50, no. 4 (Dec., 1978): 660-679.

7

meaning of serfdom in Imperial Russia. Fewer than twenty serf memoirs have been
published. I will use six of these to shed light on the legal relationship between
landowners and their serfs, the role of the state in this relationship, and on the types of
legal redress or economic opportunity available to serfs.
This chapter will also include contemporary publications dealing with serfdom, in
particular Aleksandr Radishchev’s Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, a stinging
critique of the institution of serfdom which appeared in 1790. Radishchev provided a
report on serfdom from the perspective of a nobleman who despised the institution and
called for its abolition. Radishchev condemned the exploitation of serfs by estate owners,
and highlighted the sale of serfs as among the cruelties of serfdom. In equating the
treatment of serfs to that of slaves, Radishchev anticipated a central premise of the
Consensus historians, that serfs in Russia differed little from slaves.9
The serf accounts I will examine begin chronologically with Nikolai Smirnov’s
Autobiography, written during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796). It describes
a life of relative privilege for a bonded person who suffers through a stifling system of
control and punishment for his misdeeds, “Peter O.”, “News from Russia,” a long form
poem apparently meant to be read by the tsar, referred to as a patriarchal leader who
would necessarily wish to offer protection to his subjects, no matter how lowly. The
memoir of Aleksandr Nikitenko, Up from Serfdom, documents his six-year struggle to
obtain freedom, which he did in 1824, in part thanks to his ability to make friends in high

8

places.10 Written after emancipation, “The Story of My Life and Wanderings,” by
Nikolai Shipov, is the astounding tale of a peasant trader who made multiple attempts to
escape serfdom and of self-manumission, who made use of his literacy skills to free
himself from bondage. The next memoir is that of Savva Purlevskii, A Life Under
Russian Serfdom, who was a successful business trader forced to seek redemption
following a falling out with his landlord.11 Lastly, the memoir of a serf woman, M.E.
Vasilieva, “Notes of A Serf Woman,” is a rare work revealing the perspective of a
woman and a domestic serf, or dvorovye.12
Labor Extraction in the Global Context
This chapter will discuss historians who study the coerced labor practices that
arose between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. These historians fall largely into
two groups in discussing forced labor. The first group offers interpretations for the
expansion of coerced labor and the historical reasons for it. The second group of authors,
though not in contention over the findings of the classical historians, offer newer
approaches to the study of nineteenth century labor and highlight other types of labor
extraction found throughout the competitive world commodity markets. Both groups

9 Aleksandr Nikolaevich Radishchev,

A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, translated by Leo Weiner
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).
10
Aleksandr Nikitenko, Up from Serfdom: My childhood and Youth in Russia 1804-1824, translated by
Helen Saltz Jacobson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
11
Savva Dmitrievich Purlevskii, A Life under Russian Serfdom: The Memoirs of Savva Dmitrievich Purlevskii,
1800-1868 (Central European University Press, 2005).
12
John Kenneth Mackay, Four Russian serf Narratives (Madison, WI. University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
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share the approach of treating forced labor in this era as integral to the expanding world
market and increasing efforts to maximize production and profits.
The two groups differ in that historians in the first group draw a distinct line
separating “free” and “unfree” labor, and they tend to be more concerned with the
reasons for the rise of such forms of unfree labor as slavery and serfdom, and with the
ways labor extraction was enforced, rather than with the other aspects of the day-to-day
life of these institutions. Going past explanations for why massive labor forces needed to
be tied down beginning in the sixteenth century, the second group, consisting of generally
of more recent scholars, finds that in actual practice, the divide between coerced labor
and semi-coerced labor or “free” labor was often indistinct. Their view suggests that we
focus not just on the forced extraction of labor, but also on the methods and practices
implemented to heighten productivity across a range of labor institutions, nominally free
and nominally unfree.
In the first group, Peter Kolchin and Jerome Blum, among others, assert a clear
distinction between free and unfree labor. Both authors place slavery and serfdom
squarely in the category of unfree labor. Kolchin and Blum see the growth of slave labor
in the New World and the steady loss of rights among the peasantry in Eastern European
lands in conjunction with the growing power the planter and landowning classes in the

10

Atlantic World and Eastern Europe, both of which interest groups endeavored to secure
the labor they needed, by force, to develop profit-driven agricultural production. 13
By contrast, scholars such as Alessandro Stanziani and Enrico Dal Lago, and Dale
Tomich pose the question of free and unfree labor differently. Tomich describes the
meaning of “second slavery/second serfdom” in the context of labor during the nineteenth
century. He states that the old slave economies transformed into new commodity
production areas in different geographical places, and this transformation to commodity
production also brought with it changes to the structure of labor bringing new types of
labor to replace traditional ones, but not really changing the power dynamics. Building on
this theme of change in labor systems, Stanziani tracks the widespread use, particularly
after slavery’s abolition, of various forms of contract labor in the colonial world,
including indentured servants, tenant farmers, Chinese and Indian coolies, and French
engagés. Regarding these kinds of contract labor, theoretically free, Stanziani states that
they functioned in reality as a form of coerced labor, given that the laborers could rarely
rely on the legal protections their contracts supposedly offered. This meant that,
according to Stanziani, for the former slaves who after abolition became contract
laborers, there was little difference between their former and post-emancipation statuses,
as they continued to be deeply beholden to the planter and landowning elites. 14

13

Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987); Jerome Blum, “The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe,” American Historical Review 62, no. 4
(1957): 807.
14
Alessandro Stanziani, "Local Bondage in Global Economies: Servants, Wage Earners, and Indentured
Migrants in Nineteenth-Century France, Great Britain, and the Mascarene Islands," Modern Asian Studies
47, no. 4 (2013): 1218-1251. Stanziani, "Introduction: Labour Institutions in a Global Perspective, from the
Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century," International Review of Social History 54, no. 3 (2009): 351-358.

11

Dal Lago looks to the Atlantic plantation systems in the U.S. South, Brazil, and
Cuba, and to the landed estate systems in Russia, Spain, and Italy in an era of rapidly
growing global commodities market that historians call the era of “second slavery,” and
“second serfdom.” He writes that both systems of labor extraction came to be directed at
producing cash crops for export to the world markets placing a new emphasis on
exploiting both free and unfree labor, from that of slaves to that of tenant farmers and
sharecroppers. Dal Lago observes that in this situation, in regards to labor, it was not the
distinction between free, semi-free, and unfree labor that mattered most, but that between
which techniques and practices, coercive or inducive, were developed to ensure greater
productivity.15 This then means that a mixture of coercive and inducive measures applied
to a “free” labor force might allow it to be more effectively exploited.
The Consensus authors present serfdom as extraordinary and unique in the
nineteenth century world. They claim that the institution itself was a reason for the
perception of Russian backwardness in comparison to Western Europe. The historians
presented in Chapter IV, along with other voices writing on the subject, will help us
understand where serfdom in Imperial Russia fits in the spectrum of different types of
labor extraction, from coerced labor to “free” contract labor, that emerged in the era of
second slavery and second serfdom.

And, Dale Tomich. “The “Second Slavery”: Bonded Labor and the Transformation of the NineteenthCentury World Economy.” Critical Readings on Global Slavery, 1326-1349.
15
Enrico Dal Lago, “Second Slavery, Second Serfdom, and Beyond: The Atlantic Plantation System and the
Eastern and Southern European Landed Estate System in Comparative Perspective, 1800-60,” Review
(Fernanda Braudel Center) 32, no. 4 (2009): 391-420.
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CHAPTER I
CONSENSUS HISTORIANS

The gradual process of the enserfment of peasants in Russia began, many
historians now agree, around the fifteenth century, coinciding with the centralization,
militarization, and territorial expansion of the Muscovite state. Three major historians of
peasant enserfment, Evsey D. Domar, Richard Hellie and Jerome Blum, each explained
the start and consolidation of serfdom in relation to an aspect of Muscovite expansion and
state-building. Domar links serfdom to peasant labor becoming scarcer with the increase
of arable land under Muscovite control. Hellie ties enserfment to Muscovite military
reforms and the rise of a new group of servitors to the state. Blum, like Hellie, attributes
the bonding of peasants to the land to the creation of this servitor group, but, unlike
Hellie, focuses instead on the growth of Muscovy into a centralized, absolutist state.16
Tracing these historians’ arguments and those of other scholars who concur with their
interpretations, this chapter will present an account of the development and maintenance
of serfdom in Muscovy and Imperial Russia, as well as highlight the implications of these
interpretations. This chapter refers to this group of scholars as “Consensus Historians”
because their view on serfdom’s establishment and its significance remains the
Consensus for interpreting serfdom in Russia. The “Revisionists” Chapter II discusses

16

Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to Nineteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1961). Evsey D. Domar. Capitalism, Socialism, and Serfdom: Essays.
(Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Richard Hellie, Enserfment and
Military Change in Muscovy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
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will challenge the Consensus view not by questioning the process of enserfment that
Consensus Historians present, but by critiquing the Consensus Historians’ understanding
of how serfdom as an institution worked in Russia.
Beginnings
The binding to land of a significant portion of the peasantry took more than two
centuries to complete. As late as the 1570s, according to Hellie, peasants in Muscovy
were “still moving about freely.”17 From the reign of the Muscovite Grand Prince Vasilii
II (1425-62) to that of his great-grandson, the first tsar Ivan IV (1530-1584), rapid
military expansion fueled by civil wars and wars with Muscovy’s western and southern
neighbors required the rulers to reward loyal supporters and maintain massive armies,
costs that the state was unable to pay for from the tax revenues alone.
The first major restriction on peasant movement was imposed between the 1450s
and the end of Vasilii II’s reign. The Grand Prince conferred special grants to large landowning monasteries that narrowed the time in the year that the peasants on their land
could depart for another landed estate to a two-week span around St. Georges Day.
(November 26). These grants, according to Hellie, could be considered “payoff for civilwar support,” in addition to resolving war-induced “labor dislocation” in favor of
landholders and restoring the “damaged economy by limiting peasant mobility to the
period after harvest.18 From decrees affecting several monasteries, the St. George’s Day
restriction became more widely applied in the next decades and attained the status of a
17
18

Hellie, Enserfment, 5.
Hellie, Enserfment, 81-82, 84.
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universal rule with the codification of the Sudebnik (Law Code) of 1497. The Sudebnik
specified the two weeks surrounding St. George’s Day as the only legal time peasants
could leave their landlord, provided that they had paid in full the tax and “rent”
obligations they owed the landlord before their departure. Entrenching this limit on
mobility, the Sudebnik of 1550 reiterated the St. George’s Day rule. Despite their
confirmation of St. George’s Day limits, these Law Codes did not enserf the peasants, as
they were still legally free to move to other estates.19
The broadened application and universalization of the St. George’s Day rule,
Hellie points out, was tied to the creation by Ivan III (1462-1505) of a new type of land
tenure for “service land” (pomest’e).20 As a result of the need for military servitors,
Muscovite rulers from Ivan III onward began to set up new land as pomest’ia (plural of
pomest’e) for compensating the state’s servitors. In contrast to the inherited estates, called
votchiny (singular, votchina), and held by the hereditary nobility, the boyars, who were
less dependable, pomest’ia were non-hereditary land grants the state issued to the
servitors on condition of service. According to Blum, the grand princes, in need of
reliable servitors but poor in cash, turned the land acquired through military expansion
and the confiscation of large votchina estates into parcels distributed to their loyal
servitors. This method of defeating the boyars and transferring their lands to loyal state
servitors reached an extreme with the institution by Ivan Iv, better known as Ivan the
Terrible, of oprichnina, a special territorial district with a separate jurisdiction made up

19
20

Hellie, Enserfment, 84-89, Blum, Lord and Peasant, 111.
Hellie, Enserfment, 84.
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of confiscated votchiny that were redistributed as pomest’e estates to the oprichniki, the
tsar’s servitors who formed the elite corps of guards notorious for their violence and
excesses.21
Blum points out that the difference between pomest’ia and votchiny faded away
relatively quickly. By the end of the seventeenth century, the two forms of landholding
were indistinguishable, as both pomest’ia and votchiny were inherited by the male kin of
the estate holder. In recognition of the “de facto fusion of the two forms of landholding,”
according to Blum, “the legal distinctions between them [were] obliterated by a decree
[in] 1714.”22 Even though pomest’e and vothcina estates eventually became identical
legally speaking, initially, the difference between them led to a significant disparity in
their ability to attract peasant labor, as the hereditary landholdings, votchiny, were usually
wealthier, more centrally located estates with fertile land, while the conditional
landholdings, pomest’ia, often comprised of poorer land at the frontiers of Muscovy.
As both territorial expansion and frequent warfare led to labor shortage, the newly
minted pomeshchiks (landholders of pomest’ia) competed against votchnniks (landholders
of the votchiny) for peasants to move to their estates. By the mid sixteenth century the
competition became acute as the success of the Muscovite conquests encouraged peasant
migration to the newly acquired regions in the south and southeast. This outward
migration movement often favored pomeshchiks, but time and again votchinniks gained

21

Blum, Lord and Peasant, 170. Charles J. Haperin, “Contemporary Russian Perceptions of Ivan IV’s
Oprichnina,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasin History 18, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 99-102.
22
Blum, Lord and Peasant, 183. 185.
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the upper hand in enticing peasants to their estates by paying off the peasants’ debts to
their previous landlords.
Peasants were expected to pay for the use of the lands that they resided in, along
with taxes to the state as well as meet their obligations to the landlords. This frequently
meant that the peasants were unable to pay one or the other in any given year. The later
part of the fifteenth century to the mid seventeenth century witnessed the growth of
peasant debt to the landlords. Prohibited by various forms of legal and contractual
arrangements from leaving their landlord-creditors, heavily indebted peasants, many
historians such as Blum believe, in effect found themselves “lifelong peons of their
creditors, paying interest by their labor on a debt they could never hope to wipe out by
their own efforts.”23 This indebtedness served to hold the peasants in place. At the same
time, it also played into the hands of the landlord competing for the labor of the peasants;
richer lords could induce peasants to leave one estate for another by paying their debts
off, effectively gaining peasants’ productive capacity by taking on their debt obligations.
As competition for peasant labor grew fiercer, estate holders who lost out
increasingly pressured the state to legally limit peasant movement. Some landlords also
devised their own tactics to discourage peasant departure, such as hiking up the departure
fees past the legal maximum, purposely avoiding being available on St; George’s Day for
receiving the formal notice of departure required by law, and even resorting to physical
force, as they “were also accused of beating, torturing, and chaining peasants to prevent
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them from leaving” their estates.24 For many peasants prevented from departure by
landlords and by legal and contractual restrictions, running away became an attractive
option.
The number of peasants who fled “reached incredible heights” in the sixteenth
century.25 Peasant flight was a constant issue for tax collectors as well as small and
middle sized pomest’ia. To complicate matters, a legal form of labor poaching, called
vyvoz, or exportation, became a common way for large estates to attract labor. The legal
vyvoz was the payment by a landlord receiving peasants into his estate of the exit fees and
outstanding debts owed by these peasants to the original landlord. Illegal vyvoz was the
abduction or kidnapping of peasants. Both legal and illegal forms of “exportation”
worked to the great favor of the votchinniks who had more money, land, and other
resources than the pomeshchniks, who were often recent servitors and nobility of lesser
rank. This became an acute issue for the Muscovite government because it was
increasingly dependent on these servitors and the lesser nobility, not only for reducing the
boyar influence, but also for military buildup and state centralization. The “middleservice class,” as Hellie calls these servitors, was rapidly growing as the Muscovite state
consolidated. But peasant flight from their estates left them without the economic support
that enabled their military service.26
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In response to this problem of peasant flight and vyvoz and labor poaching by land
magnates, and thus the declining economic status of the servitors just as the Muscovy
state was becoming even more reliant on them, particularly during the arduous Livonian
War (1558-1583) fought against Sweden, Poland and Lithuania, the Muscovite
government began to repeal the right of peasants to leave their landlord’s estate accorded
by the St. George’s Day rule.27 In 1580, Ivan IV decreed a ban on all peasant movement
during that year, and repeated that ban in 1581, making these so-called “forbidden years”.
At first these bans were viewed as temporary, but these “forbidden years” soon became
the norm. According to Blum, “at least half, and probably more, of the decades of the
[fifteen] eighties and nineties seemed to have been ‘forbidden years,’ and from 1603 on
every year was declared to be a ‘forbidden year’”. That these bans were seen as
temporary is shown by the rental agreements between renters and landowners of this
time, which included stipulations that the renters would, in compliance to edicts imposing
“forbidden years,” remain on the landlord’s lands until the issue of a contrary edict
ending the ban on peasant departure.28
Despite these attempts to curb peasant movement, major land magnates continued
to abduct peasants or bribe them to leave smaller landholders. The first decrees to address
this situation were issued in the 1590s under Boris Godunov, brother-in-law of the son of
Ivan IV, Theodore I (1584-1598), and the de facto ruler of Muscovy who became tsar
following Theodore’s death. As Boris, “well known as a friend of the middle service
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class,” according to Hellie, both favored the servitors and recognized the influence of the
upper nobility, which made a “comeback” after Ivan IV’s attempt to decimate it, these
decrees sought to satisfy both the small landholders and the large magnates. These
decrees placed a statute of limitations of five years for the recovery of fugitive and
“exported” peasants, which confirmed the right of the original landholders to reclaim the
peasants who contravened the departure ban. At the same time the decrees allowed the
large magnates to retain the peasants enticed to settle on their estates by placing a fiveyear limit on the original landlord’s claim. In 1607, Vasili Shuiskii, who was briefly tsar
during the Time of Troubles, a period of civil war, peasant revolt, and foreign invasion
that ensued after Tsar Boris’s death in 1605, extended the statute of limitations for
recovering runaway and exported peasants to fifteen years, in order, Hellie argues, to gain
the support of the servitors whose labor force largely dispersed at this time. Though
ineffectual, Shuiskii’s decree nevertheless fit into the general trend on the early
seventeenth century to further restrict peasant mobility by attempting to impose
increasingly punitive measures on the peasant fugitives, which accompanied the middle
service class’s repeated petitions to the government to jettison the statute of limitations
on fugitive peasant recovery altogether to make the right of recovery perpetual.29 This
meant that after the early seventeenth century, peasant renters were on a trajectory to
becoming serfs, legally bonded to the land that they resided and worked on.
In 1649 the final nail on the coffin of peasant freedom was nailed shut. As late as
1645, under Mikhail Romanov (1613-1645), who was elected tsar at the end of the Time
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of Troubles, and into the first five years of Mikhail’s son, Tsar Aleksei (1645-1676), the
servitors were unable to attain the statute of limitation’s repeal. But after a massive riot in
Moscow in 1648, during which several of the tsar’s officials met violent deaths, the
Muscovite government sought support from the middle servitors and conceded to their
demands concerning peasant mobility.30 The Sobornoe Ulozhenie, or Law Code of 1649
codified the long lists of previous edicts into an orderly arrangement. The section
pertinent to peasant mobility was Chapter I1, which dealt with fugitive peasants and the
landholders rights to reclaim them. It abolished statute of limitations for reclaiming
runaway peasant renters, and allowed landlords to deny all the members of a peasant
household the freedom of movement. The Ulozhenie granted landlords the right to move
peasant families, along with their property and livestock, from one estate to other
holdings. The Ulozhenie also deprived the peasants of full ownership of personal
property by permitting the landlord to claim all the property of the peasant renter who
departed. The Ulozhenie further stripped the peasant renters of legal independence,
requiring that their landlord must represent them in court matters of civil dispute or lesser
crimes. The Law Code did not give a legal definition of the status of the peasant renter,
nor of “his relation to his seignior”. As a result, according to Blum, “there were no legal
norms to protect the peasant against the will of his lord.” The Ulozhenie’s provisions on
peasant mobility affected a large portion of the Muscovite population. “Peasants
comprised of about 90 percent of the Russian population. Nearly three-quarters of the
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total population was finally enserfed by the Ulozhenie.” Hellie estimates.31 The historical
significance of the explanation for the enserfment provided by Domar, Hellie, and Blum,
lies in their emphasis on government action, contrary to many earlier interpretations that
attributed serfdom in Russia to spontaneous processes involving peasant indebtedness or
long-time residency that came to be viewed as obligation to stay in a fixed location. The
Muscovite “agricultural structure” had for centuries three prominent elements, abundant
“free land”, peasants who were free to move, and landholders who were “non-working”
because their primary function was state service, Domar writes. As “any two [of these
elements] not never all three can exist simultaneously,” he continues, the resolution of
this untenable situation “will depend on … political factors- government measures.”32
The series of the government edicts curtailing peasant movement that culminated in the
1649 Ulozhenie highlights the critical place of political considerations and government
actions in the enserfment of the peasant renters.
How Serfdom Worked: “Consensus” View
The 1649 Ulozhenie did not spell out the legal standing of the peasant renters or
that of their relationship to the landlords, as its provisions were directed at prohibiting
peasant movement. But Consensus historians like Domar, Hellie, and Blum, writing in
the 1960s and 1970s, are persuaded that after 1649 the enserfed peasants’ legal status was
similar to that of slaves, who were the personal property of their landlords. Although
government action was required to enserf these peasants, Consensus historians argue that
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with their enserfment the government in effect abdicated its function to govern and
juridically oversee them, leaving the enserfed to the whims of their landlords, and thereby
turning peasant renters into slaves.
Domar considers “agricultural serfdom” and “slavery” as terms that can be “used
here [in the Russian case] interchangeably,” and regards serfs as “owned” by the
landlords. For Hellie, while recognizing that “sixteenth-century Russian law did not
equate the peasant and the slave, and in fact even equated the wealthy peasant with the
syn boiaskii [member of the petty nobility],” the state efforts to limit peasant mobility
from the early seventeenth-century onward finally led to “a nearly complete identification
of peasants with slaves by the government,” which saw “both [as] equally the property of
their lords.” Although government action was crucial for enserfing peasants, these
historians concur that after 1649, the enserfed peasant was left without state protection
“against the will of his lord,” as Blum argues.33 This view of the near equivalence of
serfdom to slavery differed from that of the turn-of-the-twentieth century historian,
Mikhail Vladimirskii-Budanov, and others, which assert that the government after 1649
continued to consider peasant renters the state’s subjects, not landholders’ property.34 The
interpretation of the non-equivalence of serfdom and slavery is picked up by and lies at
the core of the argument of the Revisionist historians Chapter II explores. Below, this
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chapter presents the Consensus historians’ understanding of how serfdom in Russia
operated.
Income from pomest’e and votchina estates came from the rent paid to the
landlord by peasant renters, and later serfs, for the land they used, often in one of two
ways: labor corvée or labor dues, called barshchina, or payments in cash or kind, called
obrok,. Some landlords exacted a mixture of both. In the fifteenth century, barshchina
was generally set at one day of labor per week. This work consisted of cultivating the
landlord’s lands, as well as upkeep and maintenance of the estate. Over time the pressure
to increase rent in the form of barshchina heightened. During the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, barshchina was generally expected to consist of three days of
work per week from the peasants. After Peter I (1682-1725) introduced the soul tax (also
called the head, or poll tax) in 1724, a tax that fell on male tax-payers, largely peasants,
free and enserfed, the barshchina system of payment became widespread, especially in
the Central Agricultural region of the Russian Empire. During the early Imperial era,
which began in 1721 when Peter I was proclaimed Emperor (Imperator) of Russia, a new
emphasis on agricultural production led many landlords to expect greater output from the
serfs, and possibly to rely more on barshchina. Likely reflecting the views of the social
critics of that time, Consensus historians believe that eighteenth-century landholders
more and more saw their estates as producers of commodities meant for market
commerce and extravagant consumption, rather than for basic economic needs. Through
the eighteenth century, Consensus historians assert, following the example of some large
estates and anecdotal evidence, much of the agricultural output produced by the estates
24

was consumed by the landlord’s households residing in the urban areas. Some of the
estates had as many as a thousand retainers who each year collected cartloads of
provisions produced on the estates and directed them to the landlords’ manors.35
Despite gaining an important economic victory in 1649, numerous landholders
became increasingly financially insolvent, due often to the customary practice of partible
inheritance that decreased the size of their estates from one generation to the next. By the
eighteenth century, most landholders “had such limited means,” according to Blum, that
they were constantly in debt. Indebtedness was also common even among the richest
magnates who managed to preserve the size of their holdings and wealth through
primogeniture, though for different reasons. Eighteenth and nineteenth century Russian
nobles, after Peter I forced them to give up Muscovite ways and adopt European
behavior, began to desire goods such as Western European dress and baubles, and living
way above their means, frequently found themselves in a cash crunch. Count N.P.
Sheremet’ev, for example, owed an astronomical sum of 2,018,839 rubles in 1800. His
son and heir, D.N. Sheremet’ev owed to creditors 6,000,000 rubles in 1859.36 To get
more income “in the feudal agrarian structure” that Emil Niederhauser believes
characterized the Russian agricultural economy, landlords turned “primarily [to]
increasing the exploitation of serfs,” and to increasingly sell the surplus goods they
produced on the market.37
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Serfs on the obrok were often those who earned cash from non-agricultural work,
and the Consensus authors agree that in the main they were better off than serfs on
barshchina. Landowners in the Central Agricultural district, also known as the blackearth region, where land was fertile, tended to demand barshchina payment. Those in the
northern provinces, where the soil was poor, often favored obrok. This was a reflection
of the regional economic specialization brought about by the economic expansion of the
eighteenth century. Serfs paying obrok usually engaged in kustar, that is, artisanal and
craft production. Kustar products were in demand throughout the empire, from the
coarse, cheap wares peasants brought to village markets, to luxury articles such as silk
and objects made of gold and silver. Serfs who profited from kustar production preferred
to pay service obligation to their landlords in obrok. According to Blum, kustar
production made up and important portion of the Russian Empire’s manufactured goods
before the mechanization of factories. And according to Niederhauser, “[i]n the 13 central
non-black earth provinces 47,23% of serfs owed money services, and 30.29% owed only
robot services, while 22.49% owed both types”. Landlords who saw that obrok payment
would generate more cash, but still depended on barshchina for maintaining their estate
or putting grain on the market, would demand both forms of service obligation from
serfs.38
With regard to the question of who had jurisdiction over the enserfed peasants,
and what kind of control landlords exercised over serfs, Consensus authors describe the
Muscovite and later the Imperial government as ceding the state’s jurisdiction over the
38
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vast population of enserfed peasants to the estate holders. They argue that the
government, effectively turned over to the nobility, as estate holders, the judicial
authority to govern peasants on its land, as well as the legal right to the exploitation of
these peasants’ labor. After seventeenth-century peasant rebellions marked by the Times
of Troubles (1598-1613), and the Stenka Razin uprising, (1670-1671), Hellie states, a
common interest to defend themselves and the state against the peasants cemented the
upper and lower nobility. Thus, although the 1649 Law Code resulted from the rivalry
between the upper nobility (the magnates) and the lower gentry (the servitors), after a
century of peasant uprisings, according to Hellie, it served to defend the nobility as a
whole, and “created a closer identity of interests between the magnates running the
government and the middle service class.” Both groups, Hellie writes, were deeply
threatened by “the rebels’ proclaimed goals…to attain freedom and to kill first the boyars
and then all the lords plus military officers.”39 The state, in turn, dependent on both the
upper and lower gentry to crush the rebellions and restore stability, was unlikely to make
any concessions to the enserfed peasants as any attempt to reduce the gentry’s “caste
privileges”, Hellie argues, “might have toppled the government.”40
In Jerome Blum’s view, “the state withdrew almost entirely from supervision and
interference in the relationship between lord and peasant,” and “allowed serf owners to
gain nearly unlimited powers over the people they owned.” According to Blum, “by the
last part of the eighteenth century the Russian serf was scarcely distinguishable from a
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chattel slave.”41 Consensus Historians observe that the 1649 Law Code restricted free
movement of the peasants without providing any protections against arbitrary acts of illwilled landlords, or legal recourse in the case of abuses. One type of abuse Consensus
Historians believe was common in the eighteenth century, a prosperous era for the
nobility that followed the perils of the century before, was the buying, selling, and even
mortgaging of serfs, which leads the writers to equate such transactions involving serfs
with the contemporary slave markets the United States. Blum admits that the 1649
Ulozhenie prohibited “the sale of peasants without land,” meaning that one landlord’s
claim on an enserfed peasant could only be transferred to another landlord when the
estate the peasants lived on was sold to that landlord. But he argues that “this prohibition
had been widely disregarded,” as there were repeated bans against the sale of the
enserfed. Peter I, for example, issued an edict in 1721 censuring the violation of the
prohibition. But Peter did not fully enforce the ban, and allowed for serfs to be sold “in
cases of need.” Blum further contends, shifting from looking at serfdom to military
recruitment, that Peter in other decrees not only permitted but also encouraged “the sale
of human beings…by allowing persons subject to military draft to buy substitutes.” In
1771, Catherine II decreed that “the spectacle of human beings on the [auction]
block…be banned.” But this edict was largely ignored, such that in 1792, according to
Blum, she amended this decree to ban, not the sale of serfs, “but…the use of the hammer
by the auctioneer.” The publication of the Svod Zakonov (Collection of Laws) under
Nicholas I (1825-1855) in 1832, the first systemization of the laws since 1649, reminded
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landholders of their responsibilities to the serfs on their land. The relevant part of the
code, volume nine, aimed to curb some of the more egregious behavior of the part of the
landlords. But this code and the subsequent Penal code of 1845 did not clarify the
prohibition of trading in serfs without the sale of the land, even though, as Blum
concedes, these laws did somewhat improve the conditions of serfs.42 Generally, the
Consensus Historians believe, the government’s lack of interest in protecting the serfs
and the inadequacies of the legal codes meant that serfs were left to the will of the
landlords, as that they could not expect the government to intervene on their behalf.
Blum states that “besides acquiescing to the reduction of the seignorial peasants
(serfs) to human chattels to be bought and sold, the government sanctioned a wide
expansion in the judicial and police powers of the serfowners.”43 The Consensus authors
argue that the government did so to free itself from the onerous work of policing the
countryside. The 1649 Law Code did not prevent enserfed peasants from following the
time-honored custom of petitioning the sovereigns to seek redress against abuse.
Catherine II, however, eliminated this right to appeal to the government for direct
intervention in an ukaz (edict) issued in 1767. The ukaz, which followed a tour of the
country by the empress, during which “she had been besieged with petitions, [and after
which] decided that this nuisance must end,” forbade serfs from presenting directly to the
sovereign “petitions against their masters,” Blum writes. Violation of this decree was
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made a criminal act “punish[able] by beating and forced labor, according to
Niederhauser.44
Niederhauser, like other Consensus Historians, presents a view of a government
that was deliberately not involved in the relationship between landlords and serfs. He
writes that the laws that forbade serfs the freedom of movement, that gave them no legal
recourse to resist being sold, and forbade them from acquiring property all resulted from
the decision of the state to not intervene on behalf of serfs. Niederhauser argues that
when the state did intervene, it was to help the landlords, as in the case when estate
holders were given the right in 1822 to banish disobedient serfs or serfs they disliked to
Siberia.45
Some laws did set limits on the landlords’ right to punish disobedient serfs. For
example, certain criminal offenses were outside of the jurisdiction of the landlords, such
as murder. When landholders tried peasants on their estates for such offenses, or when
they handed out excessive or illegal punishments, they could be given severe penalties.
Though such legislation demarcated the extent of the landlords’ judicial powers, Blum
states that during the eighteenth century these boundaries were largely obliterated by
loosely phrased legislation. Some limits were introduced. especially in the 1840s and
1850s, such as rules forbidding landlords from administering overly severe punishment.
Thus, beating with a rod was limited to 40 blows, and beating with a cudgel to 15, while
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incarceration in the estate jails was not to exceed two months. If a serf violated the laws
to such an extent that more severe punishment was justified, the landlord was required to
hand over the serf to government authorities. However, Consensus authors such as Blum
insist, as the enforcement of these rules and obligations rested with the landlords
themselves, it was highly unlikely for the government to intercede except in the case of
“the most extreme and flagrant violations” by the landlord. But, Blum states “even then,
investigation was difficult,” Because, after all, serfs did not have the right to enter
complaints about their masters, for the law demanded ‘silent obedience’ from them. 46
Consensus Historians in general point to the state’s absence in the serf-landlord
relationship, since serfs could not rely on the government for protection against abuses by
landlords. Some historians, such as Steven L. Hoch, go further, arguing that when the
state’s representatives did interact with serfs, they did so in exploitative ways, extorting
serfs and taking bribes. Using the estate records from the first half of the nineteenth
century for a serf village called Petrovskoe in Tambov province, Hoch presents examples
that include the payment of twenty rubles to a rural official to avoid the obligation of
quartering government troops on the estate. When two counterfeit bills were discovered
in the villagers’ tax payment, the villagers gave fifty rubles to the government treasurer to
smooth over any misunderstandings. In 1811, upon noticing errors entered into a tax
census of that year, the village serfs paid over 300 rubles “so that the matter will not be
discovered by provincial officials.”47 Hoch shows that the serfs in Petrovskoe dealt with
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government authorities by paying off officials in order to lighten the burdens placed on
them as a result of government bureaucratic mismanagement.
Although the Consensus authors emphasize that the government did not
commonly intervene on the behalf of the millions of bound peasants, and that state
intervention usually benefitted the nobility, occasionally, some among these authors
acknowledge that the state did intervene in favor of the enserfed peasants. Hellie
demonstrates immediately following the Ulozhenie of 1649, the Muscovite government
issued a series of decrees that made exceptions to the Law Code. A 1653 decree,
reiterated in 1656, said that serfs who fled to Ukraine prior to the Ulozhenie were not to
be retrieved. Another decree, in 1675, stipulated that no former peasant or slave who
enlisted in the new regiments of the expanding Muscovite army could be forced to return
to their landlords. Yet another decree, issued in 1684, “permitted all peasants who had
fled to Moscow to remain there.”48 An example of government action that showed the
state to be not fully committed to punishing those landlords who harbored fugitive
peasants was its cancellation, in 1652, of the fines imposed on magnates found to have
done that, thereby reversing the Ulozhenie’s intent to apply financial sanctions on lords
who illegally kept runaway serfs. Thus, from Muscovy onward, although Consensus
authors argue that if there were laws that in some way favored serfs, they were rarely
enforced. Hellie’s examples here show that these laws both did exist and were enforced.
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Chapter II will elaborate on the place of the state as presented by the Revisionist
Historians.
Serfdom’s Legacy: The “Consensus” View
Discussing serfdom in the nineteenth century, an era in which contemporaries
began to perceive Russia as lagging behind Western Europe in economics and political
development, historians and thinkers began to question whether serfdom was a profitable
or efficient labor regime. Until recently, many scholars found serfdom to be incompatible
with the market economy, urbanization and industrialization that characterized Western
Europe in this period. This school of historians associated the presence of serfdom in the
Russian Empire, with Russia’s “backwardness”, relative to the industrializing and
democratizing West. Deeply influenced by this view, the Consensus authors see serfdom
as a root cause of Russian backwardness. A major proponent of the link between serfdom
and backwardness is the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron. Explaining
Russia’s “economic backwardness” compared to the industrialized West, Gerschenkron
states in a study published in 1962 that “the main reason for the abysmal economic
backwardness of Russia was the preservation of serfdom until the emancipation of 1861.”
Gerschenkron attributes the historical transformation of Russia from the small duchy of
Moscow to an immense empire in a matter of several centuries to rapid military
expansion and frequent wars with its neighbors. Hellie echoes and builds on this view. In
need of a modern military, Gerschenkron argues, the state assumed the role of the
primary agent of economic progress to meet this need. Propelled by the necessity of
military innovation, this type economic progress was not continuous, according to
33

Gerschenkron, as it sped up when military conflicts intensified, and slowed when military
needs diminished, leading to a pattern of rapid spurts of economic development followed
by prolonged stagnation. At the same time, this mode of economic growth placed a large
burden on the people. Binding peasants to land was one of the measures the state took to
exact sacrifices from them.49
Speaking of Peter I, who imported Western technology and began building a
higher education system aligned with that of Western Europe, Gerschenkron insists that
the emperor’s attempt at Westernizing Russia only made Russia less like the West.
Holding Peter’s reforms responsible for “placing the trammels of serfdom on the Russian
peasantry,” and making serfdom a central institution of Russian society propped up by
the state, Gerschenkron writes that these reforms “must be understood as the obverse side
of the process of Westernization.” Gerschenkron notes that serfdom in Russia began as an
obligation peasants owed to the state, to enable the nobility’s service to the same state.
But when serfdom became just an obligation peasants owed directly to the nobility, it was
detached from Russia’s economic development, as it now lost its broader purpose and
served only the nobility. In fact, by then serfdom only worked to retard this development,
according to Gerschenkron.50 In addition, Gerschenkron points out, during the eighteenth
century enserfed peasants’ condition worsened. Under Catherine II, he believes, the
spread of serfdom across the new territories annexed by the empress led to the increasing
severity of the nobility’s exploitation of the serfs and the rapid deterioration of their
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juridical position. Gerschenkron admits that there was “development … in certain
branches of the textile industry,” but emphasizes that “progress was almost imperceptible
in other fields, particularly in the iron industry, as the output of which hardly kept up with
the increase in population,” and that “the relative economic backwardness of the country
increased not inconsiderably during the first half of the [eighteenth] century.” This
overall lack of progress, according to Gerschenkron, was the basis for the persistence of
Russia’s backwardness throughout the nineteenth century, even after the abolition of
serfdom by Alexander II in 1861.51
Sharing Gerschenkron’s view of the shortage of capital and the poor condition of
enserfed peasants as critical factors leading to backwardness, Blum writes that “lack of
capital, the low productivity of serf labor, and the nature of the structure of the entire
‘feudal’ economy, blocked the introduction of technical improvements and efficient
organization.”52 Although he acknowledges that many advances made in trade and
industry from Peter I to Alexander II, Blum focuses on the lack of innovation in the area
of agriculture, the predominant economic activity of the empire. According to Blum, “the
techniques of tillage employed by the peasants, whether serfs on privately owned lands or
the half-free peasants who lived on state land, were virtually unchanged from what they
had been in the middle-ages.” In Blum’s view, serfs on noble estates were less inclined to
innovate than their contemporaries in Western Europe and the United States, while the
landlord’s themselves were only interested in squeezing revenues in cash and kind from
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their estates. Often the noble estate holders, according to Blum, “instead using the money
they borrowed [from the government] to improve their properties and so increase their
incomes, they spent it on consumption goods.” 53
Like many historians who study Russia, Consensus Historians such as Blum and
Hellie find factors besides serfdom as contributing to Russia’s “backwardness”. For
example, Blum sees the “fantastic inadequacy” of the empire’s system of communication
and transportation as a massive barrier to the growth of trade, and thus Russia’s
backwardness.54 On the whole, however, Consensus Historians stress the importance of
serfdom as a prevalent institution for extracting agricultural labor, and the successive
worsening of the enserfed peasants’ plight, as the primary reason for the stagnation of
Russian Economic development. The Russian Empire in their view, had kept the
institution of bondage to land far longer than its Western contemporaries, thereby holding
back social and economic progress, since the presence of serfs, being in essence slaves,
contradicted the ideals of modernity and progress. The next chapter will examine
historians who, presenting a different and more recent perspective on serfdom in Russia,
challenge the Consensus Historians’ conclusions regarding the enserfed peasants’
condition, legal standing, as well as the relationship between labor extraction based on
serfdom and the perceived economic backwardness of Russia.
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CHAPTER II
REVISIONIST HISTORIANS
Consensus Historians argue that the Muscovite and the Imperial Russian
government using the peasants as an instrument in its maneuverings for consolidating
state power with collaborations of the noble servitors, ended up binding them to the lands
granted to the nobility, and ceding the state’s jurisdiction over them to the landlords.
More recent historians, however, find the state’s role with regard to the enserfed peasants
to be more nuanced than what the Consensus Historian’s assert. The state, they argue, at
times acted to maintain the institution of serfdom, and at times to undermine it. This
chapter refers to those historians as “Revisionists” and examines the arguments of
representative members among them, such as Roger Bartlett, David Moon, Steven L.
Hoch and Alessandro Stanziani.55 Revisionist Historians challenge the depiction
presented by Consensus scholars regarding how serfdom worked. They suggest that the
economic arrangement between peasants and their landlords was more varied and flexible
than the Consensus authors allow, and the state, rather than absent, was often active in
intervening on behalf of the enserfed peasants.
State Regulations after 1649
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To the Revisionist Historians, serfdom was not a monolithic institution that was
uniform across the empire, nor did it remain unchanged from inception to abolition.
Agreeing with the Consensus Historians that the Ulozhenie of 1649 did not spell out the
legal status of the enserfed, Bartlett nevertheless points out that the lack of legislative
definition meant that peasant-landlord relations could differ considerably across the
empire, making serfdom a flexible institution, and that these relations were often
tempered by customary practices and the self-interest of the landlords, “as it was in not in
the landowners’ interest to harm their peasants or harm them economically.”56 Bartlett,
and other Revisionist Historians as well, also note that the state, particularly from the
Imperial era onward, had frequently issued decrees and regulations that affected the
relationships between the state and the enserfed peasants.
Under Peter I (1682-1725), the Muscovite-era distinction between the two types
of landholding, the hereditary votchina, held by the upper nobility, the boyars, and the
pomest’ia, granted to servitors for their service, ceased to exist. Both became known
simply as pomest’ia (estates), with their holders referred to as pomeshchiki (estate
owners). All pomest’ia were by then hereditary and landholding became severed from the
noble’s service obligation. In part to force the nobility back into service, Peter I created
the Table of Ranks in 1722, a system of promotion in the bureaucracy and compensation
by ranking that tied the preservation of the nobility status to state service, as well as
allowing nonnobles to enter state service and obtain noble status. But, forcing the nobility
back into state service, Peter did not reestablish the connection between landholding and
56

Bartlett, “Serfdom and State power,”. 31.

38

state service, since he recompensed state service not with grants of land, but with
monetary salaries.57 The disconnection of land grant from service compensation should
have led to the question of whether continued enserfment of peasants could still be
justified. In the early 1700s, however, according to Bartlett, serfdom, like slavery, was
“still taken for granted in European élite and ruling circles.” It is therefore not surprising
that Peter did not abolish serfdom, as it would have been contrary to his general policy of
subordinating all subjects of the state to state service. Peter’s extensive social engineering
and economic, political, and military reforms affected all groups in society. His measures
on the peasantry created new categories of “peasants” while also offering some protection
for enserfed peasants from excessive exploitation by landlords, but peasants under Peter I
bore the brunt of the expanding military needs of the state: they provided the recruits for
the military whose term of service was lifelong, and were subject to the “soul tax”, also
called the poll tax or head tax, introduced in 1718 and levied on all male adults of the
lower ranks of the Russian Empire’s subjects, the majority of whom were peasants.
Likewise under Peter I, a passport system was implemented to control peasant movement
and regulate labor flow, Passports were used by those seeking employment away from
their home village or registered estate, and required for labor that was both servile and
“free”. According to Bartlett, “the petty trader, the hired agricultural labourer or
industrial worker was often a landlord’s serf on otkhod (travelling to find work), and
bearing a passport from his master.”58
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Following Peter I, decades of struggle ensued between the state and the nobility
over the obligation of state service. In 1762, definitively reversing his grandfather’s
insistence on obligating nobles to perform state service, Peter III (1762) proclaimed the
“emancipation of the nobility.” Thereby abolishing this obligation and making state
service voluntary for nobles.59 To the leading historian of Imperial Russia around the turn
of the century Vasilii Kliuchevskii, Peter III’s emancipation proclamation did away
explicitly with the fundamental assumption of the Muscovite and early Imperial society,
that everyone served. Kliuchevskii believed that the abolition of compulsory gentry
service should have been in fairness immediately followed by another abolition, that of
peasant service to the noble landlords. Peasant uprisings after 1762 appeared to have
reflected the sense of injustice Kliuchevskii described, as these uprisings frequently
upheld demands for the peasant freedom that was supposed to have followed the gentry’s
emancipation.60
Catherine II (1762-1796), like Peter I, deepened the state’s reliance on the servile
system. At the same time, the position of the servile peasantry became an issue of public
concern in the Russian Empire. Different from the Petrine era, now, “across Europe,
abolitionist tendencies were stirring: moral opposition to black slavery and white
serfdom, combined with the new philanthropy of the Enlightenment combined to prompt
concern for the welfare and improvement of the lower classes.” even though “public
opinion in Europe as in Russia was still [largely] pro-slavery.”61 Bartlett describes
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Catherine II as “genuinely disapprov[ing] of serfdom,” and credits her for initiating
public discussion on the “peasant question”. The ferocity and unusual success of the
Pugachev uprising (1773-75), a Cossack and peasant rebellion led by a Cossack
commander, Emilian Pugachev, which threatened to take St. Petersburg, pushed the
empress to rely on the nobility support and abandon efforts to weaken or do away with
serfdom, as serfdom had become by her reign the mainstay of noble wealth. After the
rebellion, Bartlett writes, “she made no more public gestures towards the peasant
question.”62 In 1785, aiming to strengthen the nobility’s corporate status, the empress
issued the Charter to the Nobility, which granted new rights and confirmed the abolition
of the gentry service decreed by Peter I.
Catherine’s successor, Paul I (1796-1801), Bartlett notes, viewed serfdom as a
positive institution, and believed that the serfs were better off under the protection of the
nobility than if they were left free but unprotected and exposed to rapacious officials and
outsiders. But Paul also issued a law limiting enserfed peasants’ labor obligation, obrok,
to no more than three days a week, “presumably to protect serfs against excessive
exploitation.” According to Evsey D. Domar and Mark J. Machina, who call this “Paul’s
Law.”63
Alexander I (1801-1825) who succeeded Paul, was not a supporter of serfdom,
but he shied away from abolishing the institution. Wishing to end serfdom but favoring a
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voluntary scheme, as Jerome Blum observes in his assessment of the emperor. Alexander
issued the “Free Agriculturalist’s Law” of 1803, which gave enserfed peasants the right
to purchase their freedom from landlords, and the landlords the right to emancipate their
serfs, while also ensuring that the emancipated peasant would obtain land. Peasants freed
in this way were enrolled in the estate category (referring to the official registry of
recognized social statuses) of “free agriculturalist,” or “free farmers,” and be considered
as state peasants, meaning free peasants. Only a tiny percentage of serfs were affected by
this edict. As of 1858, three years before Alexander II (1855-1881) issued the Imperial
edict that abolished serfdom, about 1.5 percent of the total population of enserfed male
peasants, along with their families, were freed by use of this law. Alexander and his
ministers and advisors’ efforts to weaken serfdom were nonetheless adopted and pushed
even further by two of the three of the empire’s Baltic provinces, Estland and Livland
(also known as Estonia and Livonia), whose diets decided to free the provinces’ serfs
soon after 1803.64 But they implemented emancipation without land, which might have
taught the Imperial government the lesson that the emancipation of serfs in the central
parts of the empire would have to be accompanied by land for the newly freed peasants.
For Nicolas I, (1825-1855), whose central concern was social stability, serfdom
was an evil whose remedy might cause more harm than good. He was recorded as stating
in a declaration to the Council of State in 1842 that “No doubt that serfdom in its present
condition in our country is an evil, palpable and obvious to all; but to attack it now would
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be something still more harmful.” Not legislating new codes regarding serfdom,
Nicholas limited himself to confirming Paul’s Law by incorporating it into the 1832 Law
Code, and to reasserting Alexander’s “Free Agriculturalists Law,” allowing landlords to
emancipate peasants on their own. Nevertheless, it was under Nicholas I that “significant
numbers of estates” were in effect confiscated by the state as a sanction against landlords
in the wake of peasant disorders. 65 It was also under Nicholas that the number of
peasants emancipated by various methods significantly increased, as a later section in this
chapter will show.
Enserfed peasants in the parts of the Russian Empire outside the Baltic provinces
obtained their emancipation in 1861, as decreed by Alexander II. Blum calls it “the last
great triumph of royal absolutism over the nobility,” a commentary that reflects his view
of the empire as unchangingly absolutist from the Muscovite era to the 1860s. But other
historians see emancipation as the work of those whom W.B. Lincoln calls “enlightened
bureaucrats,” government ministers and advisors committed to transforming Russian
society who gained pivotal influence under Nicholas I and paved the way for the
sweeping reforms that Alexander II initiated within the first decade of his reign.66 Both
commentaries acknowledge the centrality of the state in enacting the abolition of
serfdom, as this institution did not fade away in its own in Western Europe.
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How Serfdom Worked: The Revisionist View
Revisionist Historians offer a reassessment of the institution that shows that
Russian serfs did not experience only remorseless exploitation, coercion and degradation.
David Moon explains that neither the state nor the nobility was interested in extracting
ruinous demands from the serfs, for both groups depended on them for support. After the
implementation of the “poll tax” in 1718, Moon states that the government became more
attentive to the needs of the peasants and their protection, as without the tax income from
taxing peasants the state would basically be without funds to operate the empire. From
the mid-eighteenth century both the state and the landowners who saw themselves as
“enlightened seigniors” began to define their relationship with the peasants in “moral as
well as economic terms,” even if, according to Moon, at bottom their intention “was to
make the incomes from the peasantry more secure.67
Enserfed peasants themselves at times saw that being bound to the land was not
entirely negative. As Steven L. Hoch observes, if peasants’ subsistence was to come from
the land they lived on, then “being tied to the land … implied an entitlement to the land.”
Unlike large numbers of rural inhabitants in many other European countries, “Russian
serfs were not landless labourers who depended for their subsistence on the uncertainty of
finding employment on someone else’s land,” Moon points out. He notes that the mir
(peasant commune) “partitioned, and periodically repartitioned, parcels of arable lands
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between its member households,” in order “to ensure that each peasant household had
sufficient land to support itself and meet its share of the obligations which the commune
as a whole owed” to the landlord and the state. The redistribution of peasant communal
lands was a customary practice that became widespread by the eighteenth century. It was
supported not only by the state, and landowners, but also the peasant “elites,” meaning
the elders and the leading male heads of households of the commune. “The system of
noble landownership and communal peasant landholding,” according to Moon, was to
some degree supported by the serfs themselves.68
The case of the noble landlord, I.D. Yakushkin, the future Decembrist rebel,
reflects peasants’ sense of entitlement to the land they inhabited. In 1819, Yakushkin
announced to his serfs on his estate to Zhukovo, in Smolensk province, that he wished to
free them and offer the land to them for rent, but the offer was refused because the
peasants considered the land already theirs. Moon writes, “they asked [Yakushkin]
whether the land ‘which we now possess [Vladeem]’ would ‘belong’ [prinadlezhat] to
them. On being told that it belonged to Yakushkin but that they could rent it from him
they replied that they would carry on ‘in the old way’, and added, ‘We are yours, but the
land is ours.’” In other words, given the choice between the two statuses, the peasants of
Zhukovo preferred remaining enserfed to becoming “free” tenant farmers.69
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Enserfed peasants labored on land and also engaged in a variety of other
occupations. The well-known examples mentioned by Bartlett of serf entrepreneurs who
amassed fortunes, and who, using their landlord’s name to purchase property and bypass
legal prohibitions, were themselves holders of estates inhabited by serfs, exhibit how
varied enserfed peasants’ economic existence could be. The enserfed owed to their
landlords dues that were paid in the form of barshchina (labor obligation) or obrok (in
money or kind). Serfs on the barshchina were far less mobile and led lives more closely
regulated by estate bailiffs. But, as Bartlett states, often it was in the financial interests of
the landowners to permit their peasants to pay in obrok so the peasants could take up
trade, handicraft production, and other occupations. The common use of obrok to allow a
measure of labor mobility can at times be seen from the hiring during harvest at one
landlord’s estate of peasants on obrok from another estate to supplement the labor of the
landlord’s own barshchina peasants.70
T.K. Dennison’s study of the Voshchazhnikovo estate in the Rostov district of
Yaroslavl’ province, about 300 kilometers (190 miles) north-west of Moscow and 600
kilometers (380 miles) south-west of St. Petersburg, provides an example of the kinds of
economic activities enserfed peasants could undertake. Voshchazhnikovo was the largest
of the thirty villages that comprised the estate, which took its name from the village.
Because Voshchazhnikovo belonged to the Sheremet’ev family, who had over thirty
estates that were spread across seventeen provinces, and who was among Imperial
Russia’s richest and most prominent noble families, this example is not typical of the
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empire, as Dennison acknowledges, though it was fairly average compared to the other of
the Sheremet’evs’ estates, being “neither the largest nor the smallest, neither the
wealthiest nor the poorest,” and having “no particular economic specialism
[specialization] on the estate” that would distinguish it from the other of the family’s
estates. This example is nevertheless revealing since it shows how far serfs experiences
could diverge from that commonly depicted by Consensus Historians.71
Using estate documents dating from 1750 to 1860, right up to the year before
emancipation, Dennison describes that serf on the Voshchazhnikovo estate paid the obrok
(dues in cash or kind) rather than the barshchina (dues in labor). Less than ten percent of
the serfs on the estate relied on agricultural work alone. Many of the serfs engaged in a
wide range of other economic activities. Some leased their communal land allotments to
others and took up wage-paying employment. Some serfs hired laborers to work their
allotment while they themselves traded or worked in various rural industries, at times
doing well enough to own small manufactories, for example tanneries and distilleries, and
to hire workers for these manufactories. Still others found work as migrant laborers in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, or urban centers further away.72
Serfs were legally forbidden from purchasing land until 1848, when state law
under Nicholas I removed this prohibition and permitted enserfed peasants to hold land in
their own name, but before then, such peasants did manage to buy and sell land, often
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with the aid of estate landlords who were willing to bend the rules. Sometimes landlords
did so for the payments the received for lending their name to serfs purchasing land.
Estate records at Voshchazhnikovo show that the estate’s peasants, identified in these
records as servants, agricultural workers, and unmarried women, were in possession of
land they purchased. The downside of such extra-legal land deals was that enserfed
peasant landholders ran the risk that their landlords could simply seize these holdings,
whose titles bore the landlord’s name. But, as Dennison points out, the high volume of
such extra-legal transactions involving serfs at Voshchazhnikovo perhaps shows that the
danger of such seizures was rather small on the estate.73
Serfs on the Voshchazhnikovo estate conducted credit transactions as well. These
transactions connected serfs giving or receiving credit to other estate serfs, serfs from
other estates, and often to free peasants, merchants and even landowners. According to
Dennison, the credit markets in which the Voshchazhnikovo serfs participated were not
merely local to the estate, but were instead “extensive regional networks.” In all,
whatever occupation they followed, Dennison notes, “a surprisingly large number of serfs
at Voshchazhnikovo … achieve[d] a considerable degree of wealth.” Around 70% of the
estate’s enserfed peasants “possessed taxable assets worth at least 500 rubles,” at a time
when the estate’s annual obrok dues were set at a range between 15 and 70 rubles.74
Thomas Esper provides another example of an estate inhabited by enserfed
peasants whose material condition did not match the Consensus Historians’ description of
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serf existence, in this case and industrial estate consisting of metallurgical factories in the
mineral-rich Ural region. This estate, Nizhnii Tagil, was inhabited by enserfed peasants
who had by the first half of the nineteenth century, after generations’ employment at the
factories, became in effect what Esper calls “a hereditary industrial labor force.” The
Nizhnii Tagil industrial estate was founded in 1725, beneficiary of Peter I’s efforts to
industrialize the Russian Empire. To provide the empire’s nascent industrialists labor for
their manufactories, Peter I signed a decree in 1721 allowing manufacturers to purchase
villages inhabited by peasants, who were to work in these new estate owners’ factories.
By this decree Peter invalidated the prohibition against nonnoble purchase of inhabited
land and estates, in favor of manufacturers of humble background like Nikita Demidov,
who built copper-smelting works and other plants “with his very own money,” according
to the historian Evgenii V. Anisimov. The villages purchased for industrial plants, such as
the Nizhnii Tagil estate held by the Demidov family, were known as “villages attached to
works,” and their inhabitants, as “assigned peasants,” “industrial peasants,” or “industrial
serfs.”75
By the mid-nineteenth century, Nizhnii Tagil comprised of nine factories and six
mines, “an enormous enterprise that straddled the Urals [mountain range],” and covered
2,700 square miles, according to Esper. Its mines extracted iron, copper, gold, platinum,
and malachite in large quantities. In 1859, the estate produced raw iron worth nearly 3
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million silver rubles, and counted 10,000 workers, about one-tenth of the Ural region’s
metallurgical workers.76 One of the best-known industrial estates, Nizhnii Tagil drew
favorable comments from contemporaries, but, as Esper notes, condemnation from many
later observers and historians, since these historians, like the Consensus authors, see
industrial serfs as emblematic of the worst abuse dispensed by the institution of serfdom.
Mikhail Turgan-Baranovskii, preeminent Russian historian active in the early twentieth
century, claimed, as conveyed in Esper’s words, “that the industrial serfs had to endure a
life of total slavery, working for mere subsistence from childhood to old age under the
threat of harsh punishments.” Soviet historian F.S. Gorovoi writes in 1961 of the abuses
these serfs were subjected to, “the barbarous tyranny of the factory administration, the
torturing of workers, low rates of pay and the long work day.” U.S. scholar William
Blackwell, referring in a 1968 study to the horrors he presumed were experienced by
these serfs, insists that compared to those endured by early industrial workers elsewhere
in Europe, “conditions [in the Ural factories were] made more onerous by a few more
purely Russian methods of exploitation and punishments.” Reinhardt Bendix, German
émigré sociologist and later U.S. scholar, deems in 1959 that “the doctrines of autocratic
rule assum[ing] the total depravity of workers and serfs” permeated industrial serfdom,
and that the industrial estates “punished [workers] severely if they failed in their
obligations,” as these estates “relied upon the omnipresence of fear and coercion to make
workers and serfs act as they ought to act.”77 Finally, one of the Consensus authors
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Chapter I discusses, Jerome Blum, writes of the Demidovs’ “sinister reputation,” and of
their punishment of industrial serfs “attempts by some of their employees in the early
nineteenth century to present petitions to the tsar … by shooting would-be petitioners, or
by throwing them alive into the blast furnaces.”78
Esper states that there is in fact “very little” evidence to support these scholars’
“bleak picture of industrial serfdom in the Urals.” He notes that previous studies of the
serfs, especially those by Soviet historians, derived their conclusions from tallying
worker “disturbances” (volneniia), a term that was very broadly defined to mean
“anything from acts of armed violence to refusal to obey instructions.” These scholars
identified between 47 and 111 “disturbances” for the years 1820-1860, but neglected to
notice that worker unrest and disturbances in the Urals factories generally involved only
those Esper calls “auxiliary workers,” who were unskilled, did largely menial work, and
belonged neither to the category of industrial laborers nor that of “peasants of the usual
sort.” Skilled workers, those in the shops or at the furnaces, Esper writes, “rarely
participated in disturbances.”79
The industrial serfs at Nizhnii Tagil were actually paid to work at these plants.
Though they were technically serfs, by the mid-nineteenth century the workers there were
at least three generations removed from their origin as peasants, and much closer to what
could be referred to as free industrial labor while their material condition compared more
favorably to that of factory workers in other countries at that time, as Esper suggests. The
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enserfed workers and their families at Nizhnii Tagil, in addition to wages received land
allotments provided by the estate management to grow food and raise animals for their
own use, and obtained from the estate other necessities free of cost, such as wood for
construction and fuel. This way of providing for the workers appears to be common in the
Urals industrial estates. Esper writes, “Because the worker’s families in the Urals
provided, through their own labor and independently of their industrial employment, a
significant portion of their food and housing, one could assume that in this respect their
lives were more secure that those of the laboring people in the west, who were dependent
on the receipt of money wages,” to meet their subsistence needs.80 Real money wages
were higher in Western Europe for the average worker than in the Urals. For example, as
calculated by the French sociologist, socialist, and metallurgical specialist Frédéric Le
Play, who wrote a detailed study and eyewitness account of Nizhnii Tagil, the average
wage earned by an English ironworker in the 1840s was 1,803 francs annually, as
opposed to the equivalent of 499 francs earned in a year by industrial serfs in the Ural
complexes. But the factory management in the Ural complexes bore expenses that their
counterparts in the West did not. For example, the Urals estates paid the taxes of each
male serf, regardless of whether or not he was gainfully employed, and the additional fees
to the government for exempting their workers from military conscription. The Urals
estates also paid for social services such as old age and disability pensions, and free
health care. By the mid-1850s, 42 percent of the estate’s overhead costs went to
providing for these social expenses at Nizhnii Tagil. This was on the high end, as other
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estates paid less for social services: for instance at the Neviansk complex it was 27
percent of its overhead costs, and at Alapaevsk, 16 percent. But these estates included
social expenses as a given.81
Visiting the industrial complexes of the Urals in the 1840s, the renowned British
geologist Roderick I. Murchison was deeply impressed by both the privately held estates,
like Nizhnii Tagil, and the state-run operations. He wrote, “the Russian miners … have
thinned the forests, erected commodious and often splendid buildings,” and the resident
population there was “more advanced in knowledge than any” elsewhere in the Russian
Empire. Under “the highly flourishing condition of these centres of industry, each more
populous and thriving than many towns” in the empire, he continued, lived “many
thousand industrious workmen, whose houses and essential comforts we have seldom
seen surpassed in the manufacturing towns of Europe.” Other contemporary visitors have
noted that the Urals industrial complexes included, apart from schools for the workers’
children and hospitals that provided free care, also a public library, a museum, and a
botanical garden. One traveler in 1848 described Nizhnii Tagil’s hospital as “excellent,”
and soon after, the estate-town had two hospitals and two nurseries. Le Play observed
that, as Esper phrased it, the empire’s “best health and educational services for the
workingmen were to be found at the [Demidov’s] metallurgical plants.82
The evidence Esper finds indicates that the industrial serfs of the Urals,
particularly the shop workers, were no more exploited than were free workers in Western
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Europe, and that in some respects, their lives were more placid and stable. Like the
enserfed peasants at the Sheremet’ev estate of Voshchazhnikovo, the workers at Nizhnii
Tagil, Esper finds, could hold property, although unlike the Voshchazhnikovo peasants
they were prohibited from selling to those outside the estate or mortgaging their property.
With regard to the social services workers; obtained from the industrial estates, many
workers in the Ural factories “so valued this security that some of them received their
emancipation in 1861 with dismay,” Esper writes, for they considered these services their
“rights.” Some went so far as to petition the state “for a return to the old serf system,”
according to Esper. For their part, the estate management could dispense with providing
social guarantees after emancipation. Esper points out that the Nizhnii Serginsk factory
complex, also in the Urals, reported in 1863 a net savings of 170,000 rubles compared to
pre-emancipation years. That is, even though after 1861 the wages paid to the complexes’
workers increased to 52,000 rubles a year, “the ending of serfdom” had eliminated
around 223,000 rubles in annual expenses that covered, along with the taxes and fees paid
on behalf of the male workers, the social guarantees the workers and their families had
come to expect.83 Emancipation in the case of many Ural workers turned out to mean the
severance of the reciprocal obligations between the enserfed and the estate landlords. If
the workers were now “free” to move and seek employment elsewhere, the estate owners
were now “free” to not provide social services.
Jurisdiction: Who Governed Enserfed Peasants?
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Consensus Historians, as shown in Chapter I, believe that the state after acting to
enserf peasants no longer had a role in governing the peasants, leaving them entirely to
the control and “whims” of their landlords, that both the Muscovite and the Imperial state
did rely on the nobility to govern the state’s vast territories at the local level, reflected in
Nicholas I’s view of the landlords as “100,000 rural police chiefs” who would, as Bartlett
states, served as “a substitute for local government” in the countryside, seems to confirm
this belief.84 But attempting to establish local government based on extending the
nobility’s prominent local position did not always mean allowing gentry landlords
unrestrained domination over their estates and locality. More often, even as gentry
domination of the countryside prevailed, the state’s reliance on the nobles for local
administration also meant delegating responsibility and decentralizing the state’s purview
for such critical purposes as collecting taxes, providing for empire-wide communication
networks, and ensuring disaster relief in times of hardship caused by natural catastrophes.
Revisionist authors indicate that the enserfed peasants mostly “ate relatively
well,” Moon writes, and lived in “relative, if tenuous prosperity,” as Hoch shows for the
peasants of Petrovskoe in the Tambov province, about 280 miles southeast of Moscow.
But the precariousness of their life would be evident in the years of bad harvest and
famine. In 1734, under Empress Anne (1730-1740), a state law demanded private estates
provide relief during such times of food shortage, the state often lowered grain prices to
ensure for the peasants. A series of failed harvests in the early nineteenth century led the
state to insist that landlords provide famine relief for the peasants and set up reserve
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granaries. During the famine of 1833-1834, under Nicholas I, the central authority in
Moscow and the provincial government together issued 22 million paper rubles to ease
the supply of money and to alleviate the disaster in the rural areas.85
With regard to local governance, the state permitted very large estates, such as the
Voshchazhnikovo estate held by the Sheremet’evs, to create a regularized administrative
system for these estates through issuing their own decrees (prikazy) and statutes, called
“instructions” (instriuktsii). Dating back to the late eighteenth century, the decrees and
instructions for Voshchazhnikovo dealt with a broad range of activities. They included
the assessment and collection of taxes and dues, “rights … to [such] communal
resources” as forests and meadows, regulations for building new structures like homes
and barns, the registration of the peasants’ “estate” (soslovie, referring to social status,
not land), rules for hiring or renting property to outsiders, and fines and punishment for
breaking the Voshchazhnikovo estate’s policies. When a situation not foreseen by the
decrees and instructions arose, Dennison writes, the estate bailiffs drew on “a sort
precedence system” by referring to policies and principles established in other estates.
Contrary to the Consensus authors’ assertion that landlords’ treatment of their peasants
was guided by “whim,” Dennison notes that Voshchazhnikovo’s manger-administrators
“evidently tried to avoid arbitrary forbidding” when deciding on peasant requests or
infractions.86
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Commenting on the purposes of these estate-issued instructions and edicts,
(nakazy), Alessandro Stanziani notes that imperial Russian state law recognized these
estate edicts as having the “force of law.” According to Stanziani, this recognition,
contradicting the Consensus Historians’ view of the governments’ absence in the affairs
of the noble estates, “testified to the tsarist state’s determination not to abdicate its
authority inside the estates,” and its aim “to decentralize the production and the
application of the rules” that followed principles upheld by and codified in state law.
These principles included, Stanziani writes, pushing nobles “to run their estates in a more
rational way” and us[e] more advanced farming techniques,” as well as to devise rules
directed at “reducing social tensions,” especially after the Pugachev revolt in 1773-1775,
and “preserving [the state’s] pool of soldiers.87
At Nizhnii Tagil, which in 1840 had a managerial-administrative staff of 555
members, “most of whom were themselves serfs,” according to Esper, the state made its
presence known through the factory inspectorate commission it dispatched to the Urals
industrial estate. The commission’s reports from the 1850s rated private industrial estate
such as Nizhnii Tagil with regard to the quantity of iron processed, the volume of fuel
and ore reserves, the enterprises’ “economic and technological condition,” and how well
they maintained their labor force. Although these reports had few details concerning
working conditions, as Esper notes, they nonetheless reflected a ranking of preferences
for how estates should treat their workers. The ranking had at the top “complete
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paternalism,” followed by “complete satisfaction” in the way “people are maintained,”
down to “maintained well” and “maintained justly” for the middling ratings, and
“maintained unsatisfactorily” and “unjustly” for the lowest ratings.88
The presence of the state in the private estates such as those of the Sheremet’evs,
the Demidovs, and the Gagarins, whose Petrovskoe holding Hoch examines, was often
felt indirectly, by the need to skirt official regulations. The private estates tended to bend
rules to permit, for instance, the buying and selling of property by the enserfed, which
was prohibited by government law. But these practices of rule-bending remained
extralegal, and were not recognized outside the particular estates that allowed them.
Within these estates, however, enserfed peasants frequently could and did make use of
the estates’ judicial provisions to assert their claims, litigating at times against the peasant
communal heads, at times against the estates bailiffs.89 The informal system provided by
these estates let some of the estates’ enserfed peasants prosper in extralegal activities, but
they came at a cost. These estates’ “extralegal social conventions,” Dennison writes,
quoting Hernando de Soto’s term, also left the peasants open to demands for extra
payment premiums for engaging in officially sanctioned transactions, or “bribery,” for
example in the form of higher property down payments, hefty fees for the estates’ “power
of attorney contracts” (doverennost’, i.e. certifications) for the use of the landlord’s name,
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commission to the landlord for lending his name to this certification, or outright
payments to state officials for looking the other way.90
More directly, though perhaps relatively infrequently, the state’s presence could
be felt, according to Dennison, “when officials in St. Petersburg showed that they were
willing to rule against local elites when provided with evidence of wrongdoing.” In
exchange for conferring the “force of law’ on estate-issued regulations, the central
government expected estate owners to bear primary responsibility for good order on their
lands. “The lords’ authority could be withdrawn by the tsar at any moment,” according to
Stanziani, for “abus[ing] their power,” or for illegally holding the title to an estate, such
as in the case of nonnobles claiming ownership of inhabited lands, a privilege that was by
law only granted to the nobility for the greater part of the pre-emancipation years. The
most severe sanction against landlords found to have neglected or excessively punished
their serfs was to confiscate their estates and place the estates under the stewardship of a
family member or trustees appointed by the local nobility. Catherine II gave the threat of
this sanction “greater force” in 1775, around the time of the Pugachev rebellion that
galvanized enormous contingents of discontented enserfed peasants. During the reign of
Nicholas I, “significant numbers of estates were taken into trusteeship (opeka),”
according to Moon. Citing documents from the Ministry of Justice, Moon states that
between 1834 and 1845, the number of landlords tried for the ill-treatment of their serfs
was 2,838, of whom 630 were found guilty. The state was not always successful at
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protecting the serfs from their landlords’ exploitation, Moon writes, as the enforcement of
the state law relied on the nobles themselves, who dominated the rural and provincial
courts, to rule against their own. However, the threat of the state intervention in estate
affairs served to offer some restraint against abusive landlords, and reinforced
expectations for how “good masters” should behave. These expectations amounted to,
Moon observes, what E.P. Thompson calls a “moral economy” based in large part on the
enserfed peasants’ “subsistence ethic.”91
Finally, the state’s presence was felt in the ways enserfed peasants could change
the legal registration of their “estate” status (soslovie; referring to social position and
occupation, not land) or that of their children from “enserfed peasant” to other estate
categories. This could occur through marriage. Dennison finds that a number of the
“poorer serfs” at the Voshchazhnikovo estate strove to have their children marry
“members of a higher social category (soslovie),” that is, of a higher-ranking estate, such
as merchants or townspeople, and were willing to pay exorbitant fees to obtain their
landlord’s permission for marrying outside their estate status. The requests for permission
mostly involved daughters. Dennison does not specify whether the estate (soslovie)
registration of the serf brides would change to that of her husband after marriage, but
presumably in either case the offspring of these marriages would take the estate of their
father, making it possible for a serf family to have its descendants leave behind the legal
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status of the enserfed in a generation or two. Reviewing the law codes of Imperial Russia
issued after the 1830s, Stanziani mentions that the widows of serfs could change their
legal estate status if they “married someone belonging to another legal category.”92
Other channels for changing the estate status of the enserfed include voluntary
emancipation by landlords, who were legally permitted to do so after the 1803 Law of the
Free Agriculturalists. Peasants who were transferred in violation of the law by their
landlords to lands held by nonnoble or nonnoble corporate entities would be removed
from the landlords, reascribed to the estate status of “state peasants,’ and became “free”
because state peasants did not owe dues in labor or in kind to their landlord, the state. In
1841, for instance, according to Stanziani, large numbers of enserfed peasants saw their
status change to “state peasant” because their landlords illegally transferred them to
ecclesiastical estates. Perhaps one of the more common ways for enserfed peasants to
change their status was through military service. The army, in Stanziani’s view, was a
“powerful source” of change with regard to serfs’ legal status. Prior to emancipation,
conscription took into the army mostly serfs who had no choice, as conscripts served for
twenty to twenty-five years, after which they were usually unable to return to their home
village, their place having been taken by others. Thus, upon completing his military
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service, the conscript would be reclassified as a state peasant or as raznochinets (literally,
a person of nonnoble rank”), an estate category that would allow the former serf to
become part of the urban population. By these various means, close to half a million
enserfed peasants changed their legal status between 1833 and 1858, according to Steven
L. Hoch and Wilson Augustine. More boldly, taking into account the changing legal and
administrative acts that affected the enserfed, Stanziani estimates that “almost half the
Russian serfs had been emancipated from their obligations to private owners in the
decades before the official abolition of serfdom” in 1861. He further posits that “Russian
emancipation was already in progress before [1861], promoted through administrative
and political measures with a minor contribution from the judicial system.” On the eve of
emancipation, 52 million of the empire’s population were classified as belonging to the
peasant estate.93 Of these, 20 million were “enserfed peasants” by estate status, or 38
percent. Among the 32 million peasants who were “free,” or 62 percent, quite possibly a
good portion were former serfs who only recently effected a change in their legal status.
Serfdom’s Legacy: Backwardness?
The picture of serfdom presented by Revisionist Historians differs greatly from
that offered by Consensus scholars. Not surprisingly, the Revisionist view of the
historical significance of serfdom in Russia diverges substantially from that of the
Consensus view. Consensus Historians believe that serfdom caused the empire to be
backward, implicitly holding up Western Europe economic and political development as
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the standard for comparison. Revisionist Historians, challenging what it means to be
“backward” and using the lens of contemporary ideals, turn instead to look at how well or
poorly the bondage of peasants to land served the state and empire.
Bartlett argues that not only did serfdom not hamper the expansion and
international standing of the Russian Empire, but, by providing the Petrine state “the
money (taxes) and rank-and-file manpower which supported both the fisc and the armed
forces,” it was also a contributing factor to the success of the empire. Catherine II,
Bartlett continues, promoted public welfare, education, and administrative order, and
achieved immense military and territorial gain, “without major changes in the status of
the servile peasantry.” Under Alexander I, the Russian army, made up of peasant
conscripts, defeated the Napoleonic military machine, catapulting the Russian Empire to
the top of the European powers.94
Contrary to the image of unrelieved social and economic degradation Consensus
scholars offer, Revisionist Historians, referring to archival estate documents, point to
significant numbers of enserfed peasants who were prosperous and flourishing,
particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century. Revisionist disagree on the cost of
this prosperity, however. Dennison observes that the bribes and extra fees the enserfed
had to pay to circumvent state laws and estate rules amounted to a “confiscatory pattern.”
These costs, Dennison states, “obviously diminished the incentive to engage in the sort of
entrepreneurial initiatives that played such an important role in the agricultural and
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industrial revolutions in early modern England,” and served to curtail the successes of the
serfs.95 Moon shows, on the other hand, how the customary practices, state laws, and
estate rules that might have been seen by some peasants as overly rigid and had to be
circumvented, might have been taken for granted by others as the basis of social
guarantees and protections.
Moon demonstrates that serfs were not itinerant workers without access to land,
as was so commonly the case in Western Europe by the early twentieth century. He
describes the Russian peasant commune (mir), whose workings ran against property
ownership, as a defense against exploitation, as it regularly re-parceled land to give every
serf family access to productive lands, and shared the tax burden in an equitable fashion
to relieve the destitute of financial destruction.96
With regard to the efficacy of serfdom as an economic institution, the view of the
Soviet historian M.N. Pokrovskii is representative of the Consensus position. He argues
that, in the words of Evsey D. Domar and Mark J. Machina, “serfdom had become
unprofitable for the masters,” and thus the reason for the Russian state to free the serfs in
1861. Testing Prokrovskii’s assertion, Domar and Machina’s analysis of price levels,
demographic trends, and land availability, concludes however, that “we have not found
that the profitability of Russian serfdom before 1861 was threatened” by the nineteenthcentury trends often seen as undermining the profit from serf labor, such as the rise of
grain prices, population growth, and the increasing use of the obrok (dues in money and
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kind) system, which allowed for greater labor mobility and took peasants away from their
landlords’ estates and home villages.97
With regard to policy and jurisdiction, as Stanziani and Dennison show, rather
than arbitrary and capricious, both the state authorities and the estate managements
attempted to govern rationally, with the estates building on customary practices to devise
a set of rules and “instructions” to govern estates, and to fill in the gaps left by state law.
Stanziani suggests, in fact, that the combined jurisdiction of the government and the
estates had allowed for a gradual erosion of serfdom, as increasing numbers of those
ascribed to the estate category of “enserfed peasants” found ways to register in another
category. But the shock of the “Crimean debacle,” as Bartlett calls Russia’s defeat in the
Crimean War (1853-1856) that forced the Russian Empire off “the pinnacle of Great
Power status,” left little room for a gradual process and propelled “the issue of serfdom to
the top of the Imperial agenda,” according to Bartlett.98 Soon after, signaled by Alexander
II’s 1861 edict of emancipation, the Imperial state moved to undertake a profound
transformation of the empire, showing the full force of its presence in peasant and gentry
society.
The Revisionist view of serfdom challenges earlier assumptions about the
institution of serfdom. Chapter III shows that the experience of serfs, as told by the
peasants themselves, varied widely and the institution was far from monolithic.
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CHAPTER III
SERF MEMOIRS AND OTHER WRITINGS
This chapter focuses on the memoirs and the autobiographical accounts of
enserfed peasants in the Russian Empire, of which about twenty are known to exist. This
chapter examines, listed here in rough chronological order, the writings of Nikolai
Smirnov (1767-1800), an unidentified serf who called himself “Peter O.”; Aleksandr
Nikitenko (1804-1877): Nikolai Shipov (1802-?); Saava Dmitrievich Purlevskii (1800ca.1868); and M.E. Vasilieva, (dates unknown), who told of her life as a serf girl. 99
To set these accounts of enserfed peasants in the greater context of
historiographical interpretations, this chapter will begin by discussing Aleksandr
Radishchev’s A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow (1790), a stinging critique of the
institution of serfdom. An exposé of the horrors of serf life, it was the earliest literary
work to deal solely with enserfed peasants. Radishchev provided a report on serfdom
from the perspective of a nobleman who despised the institution and called for its
abolition. He condemned the exploitation of serfs by estate owners, and highlighted the
buying and selling of serfs as among the cruelties of serfdom.100 In equating the treatment
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of serfs to that of slaves, Radishchev anticipated a central premise of the Consensus
Historians, that serfs in Russia differed little from slaves.101
The influence that “A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow” had on the
historiographical interpretation of the institution of serfdom can hardly be overstated.
Highlighting Journey’s critiques of serfdom, this chapter shows the links between the
description of serfdom that appeared in Radishchev’s book and that of the Consensus
authors.
Radishchev’s Journey
Published anonymously and with Radishchev’s own funds, the Journey came out
in 1790, the same year that his civil service to the state granted him the promotion to the
position of Chief of Custom House at the busy and highly important port of St.
Petersburg. Although Radishchev submitted the manuscript to the censor prior to
publication, the version he printed included additional material that the censors approved
without having read it. Despite the ploy of anonymity, the author’s identity was
discovered without difficulty, given the small circle of writers and intellectuals at this
time. Responding to his work, Catherine II wrote ten pages of closely spaced text of
detailing her impressions and counter arguments. According to her secretary Alekandr
Khrapovitsky, “[the empress] was graciously pleased to say that he [Radishchev] was a
rebel, worse than Pugachev,” the Cossack leader of a devastating rebellion fifteen years
before whom Catherine put to death.102 Radishchev was condemned to death, although
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his sentence was soon commuted to banishment to Ilimsk, a small town in eastern
Siberia, for ten years. In 1796, Paul I permitted Radishchev to return to one of his estates
in European Russia, while keeping him under observation by the local authorities.103
After Alexander I came to the throne, hoping to but unsuccessful in urging the new
emperor to adopt legal and constitutional reforms, and stung by the rebuke of his ideas by
critics, Radishchev committed suicide by poison in September of 1802 at the age of 53.104
A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow traced a fictional journey whose
narrator was based on Radishchev himself. This fictional journey was a compilation of
stories, each titled after the name of a postal stop (resting station for Imperial couriers,
change of horses, and travelers) The stories introduce readers to long-suffering peasants,
evil and greedy gentry, pompous and venal officials and clergy. Throughout, Journey
lamented the fate of the peasants, whose condition it equated to slavery, and whose ill
treatment in turn, it argued, corrupted those among the free who might, without serfdom,
have been good and noble people.
Landowners in Radishchev’s work represented the worst that society could
produce. Journey exposed their cruelty and rapaciousness. Near the postal stop of
Lyubani the narrator encountered a serf who was forced to plough the fields of the
landowner six days a week, meaning the labor due (barshchina) he owed to his landlord
was an unusually high six day a week, leaving only Sunday for him to plow his own plot
of land. The narrator surmised that the landlord must have refused to take a due in obrok
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(money or kind), thus forcing the peasant to stay on the estate and be barred from
traveling to seek work away from his land.105 At Vyshny Volochok, the narrator heard of
a landowner who compelled his villagers to work “everyday of the year for him.” This
estate owner filled his granaries and gained admiration as a “famous agriculturalist” by
“multiplying the number of those groaning in his fields.”106
Turning to another facet in the oppression of serfs and the tyrannical arbitrariness
of landlords, the narrator described a scene at Gorodnya that showed the destructiveness
of military recruitment, as it tore young men from their families, dooming them to never
return to their native village. But however distressful the life of a conscript, at Gorodnya
the narrator found a young man who preferred it to suffering the constant torment his
master’s new wife directed at him with no fear of legal restraint.107 At Mednoe, the
narrator came across an auction for selling a family of serfs. He decried the inhumanity
and frequency of such auctions, which occurred “twice every week [and] the whole
Russian Empire is notified” to attract prospective buyers, and the profligate landowners
trying to pay their debts through these sales. At the Mednoe auction the narrator saw a
family of serfs, an aged man who served loyally the father of the “young master” selling
him; the serf’s wife, an old woman who nursed the young master’s mother; their daughter
or daughter-in-law, a widow, who was the young master’s wet nurse and “second
mother”; and the granddaughter of the family, whom the lascivious master tricked and
seduced, and who bore his child, an illegitimate son who was also to be sold with the
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family. With sympathy Radishchev’s narrator related the story of the young serf man on
the auction block, the husband of the granddaughter. With “savagery … in his eyes,” the
young serf, once “the companion and intimate of his master” whom the master used to
deceive the girl who was then wedded to him, dreamed of vengeance. “A hopeless
fancy!” the narrator interjected, for “government justice” would side with the landlord,
and resistance would only lead to “a languishing death in fetters.”108
Sometimes even government officials could not endure the injustice of the laws.
A traveler Radishchev’s narrator meets on the road was a former judge on the provincial
court who left his position because he could not uphold laws that served only to suppress
and punish innocent victims while protecting the corrupted gentry.109 This and other
stories led the narrator to reflect on the true nobility and dignity of the simple country
people, who strove to make modest gains in the face of the increasing demands the gentry
placed on them.
Radishchev’s narrator described the lot of the serf as “of one cast into fetter, of
one thrown into a dismal dungeon: the lot of the ox under yoke.” He decries the
condition of both the master and slave: “On one side there is almost unlimited power; on
the other, helpless impotence. For the landlord is to the peasant at once legislator, judge,
executor of his own judgements, and, if he so desires, a plaintiff against whom the
defendant dare say nothing.”110 Asking the question, “Can a country in which two-thirds
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of the citizens are deprived of their civil rights and to some extent are dead to the law be
happy?”111The narrator warned of the peasant insurrections that would result from the
crushing oppression. Inveighing against this oppression, Radishchev’s narrator appealed
to his readers, “you [who] wish to be called merciful, and you [who] bear the name of the
guardian of public good!” to take action. Against the “famous agriculturalist” who
squeezed his serfs to fill the granaries, the narrator, akin to inciting revolution and
rebellion, called on his readers to “destroy the tools of his agriculture, burn his barns,
silos, and granaries, and scatter their ashes over the fields where he practiced his tortures;
stigmatize him as a robber of the people so that everyone who sees him may not only
despise him, but shun his approach to avoid infection from his example.”112 Throughout,
A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow served as an impassioned argument for the
state and the landowners to change their ways, and for serfdom’s abolition, in effect.
Radishchev’s Journey anticipated the central themes in the Consensus authors’
studies of serfdom: the inhuman exploitation of serf labor, with landlords preferring
barshchina to obrok, and pushing barshchina dues to the brink of the peasants’
destruction; the equivalence of serfdom to chattel slavery, exemplified by the auction
block; the arbitrary authority that landlords wielded over the enserfed, abetted by
“government justice”; the landlords’ cruelty, greed, and lasciviousness against which the
peasants could hope for no defense from the state. While there were notable instances
that matched Radishchev’s exposé of landlord excess, it is not clear how representative

111
112

Radishchev, A Journey, 147.
Radishchev, A Journey, 159-160.

71

they were, and the overall accurateness of the depiction of the landlord-peasant
relationship Radishchev presented is questionable, as Chapter II shows.
Also, Radishchev neglected to take into account what Richard Pipes calls “the
constraints of custom,” which Pipes believes prevented the enserfed in Russia from
“sink[ing] to the status” of the enslaved in North America, even though Pipes also agrees
with the Consensus authors that by the eighteenth century, “landlords acquired virtually
unlimited power over their serfs.” From their perspective, when addressing their
landlords about the land they lived on, the enserfed peasants persisted that, according to a
well-known peasant saying David Moon quotes, “We are yours, but the land is ours,”
making it clear that although the landlords could attach them to the land, the land in turn
was unbreakably attached to them.113 With regard to barshchina, a target of Radishchev’s
condemnation, how much labor a barshchina due could demand was often determined by
custom, not by the landlord’s greed. In some parts of the Russian Empire, such as “Little
Russia” (today’s Ukraine), the barshchina due was two days a week under Catherine II,
very likely following customary practice. Paul I’s 1797 law limiting barshchina to no
more than three days a week, which “was presumably [issued] to protect the serfs against
excessive exploitation,” as Domar and Machina observe, in fact had the effect of raising
the barshchina in these parts from two to three days a week.114
Life of the Enserfed: Their Own Accounts
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The serf- or former serf- authors this chapter discusses had experiences and
occupation that, taken together, add up to a fairly different image of serfdom than that
presented by Radishchev, even as some of these recollections expresses an aspiration for
“freedom” that matched the message of Radishchev’s stories in Journey.
The authors were literate at a time when literacy was not widespread even among
serfs. Except for Vasilieva, who was a house servant (dvorovaia), these authors took up a
wide

range of occupations, even though the condition of serfdom was to be bound to

land, they were highly mobile. The physical and social mobility of enserfed peasants was
often evident in historical records and memoirist works, according to Boris B. Gorshkov,
editor and translator of Saava Dmitrievich Purlevskii’s autobiographical account.
Serfdom, Gorshkov writes, while serving “its fundamental purpose of preserving
hierarchy … simultaneously opened the door to a certain societal mobility for serfs,” as
well as physical mobility, as testified by both active internal passport system and the
growing seasonal migration of enserfed peasants in the first half of the nineteenth
century, with regard to the quest for “freedom” invoked in some of these serf accounts, it
is possible that it reflected not only the authors’ sense of despair and anger in the face of
the social hierarchy enforced by serfdom, but also, according to Gorshkov, “the language
of freedom and equality” that the educated elites absorbed from reading the
Enlightenment philosophers, and that “penetrated the minds and discourses of the
common folk” as well.115
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Nikolai Smirnov: A “Confession” (1785)
The earliest of the autobiographical stories in this chapter, Nikolai Smirnov’s
testimonial was written in 1785. A contemporary of Radishchev, Smirnov was arrested
that year for attempted flight across the Russian Empire’s western border. Smirnov
composed this account of his life in the form of a confession. Although spared the death
penalty, which the court had considered a fitting punishment, he was sentenced to “have
his nostrils ripped open,” and faced being branded and beaten with a knout, as well as
being sent to Riga (in today’s Latvia) in shackles for hard labor. Collected in the files of
the St. Petersburg Secret Investigation Office, this “confession” came out of Smirnov’s
request to the general prosecutor to explain why he broke the law, and his show of “a
desperate if ambivalent expression of penitence,” according to MacKay. 116
Smirnov was the son of a serf estate manager for the high-ranking old-noble
family of the Golitsyns, who owned multiple estates near Moscow. Smirnov’s father paid
for his education, employing tutors to teach him Russian grammar as well as the basics of
French and Italian. He went on to study at the Moscow University which was attended
by many of Russia’s elite, having been given special permission by the director that
allowed him, a serf, to attend without formal enrollment. There he continued his
education in such fields as history, geography, mythology, iconography, and English. He
also engaged tutors to teach him mathematics, architecture, draftsmanship, and painting.
But, “due to an illness I contracted” in Moscow, Smirnov returned home after less than a
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year, where his father “kept [Smirnov] by his side” and put Smirnov to work on estate
business. At home, while working for his father, continued his education with professors
of Moscow University, who gave him private lessons in English, “a subject for which I
had a great predilection.” Despite his illness and bad health, Smirnov continued his
studies this way for over a year, until he was interrupted for just as long a period, having
been called to work on the landlords plans for and estate villages’ “wastelands and
settlements,” and, later, on compiling information for the government census. Carrying
out these tasks, “every day I was compelled to write and copy orders and expense sheets
for the village, to work on the account books, and to do many other things concerning the
house and estate.” This was work for which “I had not the slightest ability or inclination,”
Smirnov wrote.117
Smirnov wrote that he desired to “renew my now lapsed studies,” and “these
vexations and barriers continually placed in the way of my desires made my life …
utterly hateful to me.” Frustrated at being forced to do clerical work on the estate,
Smirnov saw himself as a “slave” (Kholop) “whose degrading name” incessantly
reminded him that “I was in bondage on a heavy and oppressive chain.” Smirnov pleaded
with his father to petition the estate owner for manumission for his son to their masters.
This request was denied, leaving Smirnov “without the slightest hope of ever enjoying
that which seemed more precious than anything: freedom.”118
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Endeavoring to be manumitted by other means, Smirnov asked for help from his
maternal uncle, a nobleman named Seniavin, a family connection that suggests Smirnov’s
mother might have belonged to a different estate status, possibly a member of the
nobility. Seniavin was to negotiate with the Golitsyns to either replace Smirnov with two
serfs of his own or to entreat the Golitsyns to send him off to the army. This request was
also denied, once more leaving Smirnov in despair. Upon learning that his young masters,
two Golitsyn lords, were going to voyage through Europe, Smirnov thought to sneak
away to them and offer himself as a travel companion, thereby befriending them and
earning their trust and eventual manumission from them, while gaining the chance to
continue his studies of Italian language and architecture. With money stolen from his
father, an extraordinary 3,500 rubles, false identity papers and travel documents, and the
aid of a serf who studied architecture with him, Matvei Kurbatov, Smirnov and his
“comrade Kurbatov” set out for Riga, intending to get across the border at the first
opportunity.119
Midway in his journey to the border, Smirnov met swindlers who persuaded him
to head instead For St. Petersburg, and led him “into sundry dissipations” and enormous
expenditures. When arrested in St. Petersburg, Smirnov wrote, “I comforted myself with
the thought that my adventures would conclude with my being delivered to my master,”
from whom “the only punishment I anticipated was conscription in the army,” which fate
Smirnov “had regarded as the greatest happiness.”
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Sentenced at first to execution by hanging, probably for not just for flight but also
the impersonation of an Imperial officer, Smirnov was saved from death by the direct
intervention of Catherine II, who commuted his sentence to exile, in the words of the
Imperial order MacKay quotes, “as a soldier to the military troops stationed at Tobol’sk,
a city in Siberia, where he remained for the rest of his short life.” Catherine’s intervention
may have been due to the request of Princess Daria Alekseevna Golytsyna, to whom
Smirnov wrote a letter, “tearfully asking her” for “intercession [to] preserve me from a
most unspeakable death.” In exile, Smirnov seemed to have continued to write, not
confessions, but essays for publication, and very likely met Aleksandr Radishchev there,
who was also living in exile in the city until his return to European Russia. Pavel
Aleksandrovich Radishchev, in his biography of his father, mentioned “a certain Smirnov
living in Tobol’sk” in 1797, when Radishchev was there. This Smirnov “was a freedman
formerly belonging to Prince Golitsyn and had been educated with Golitsyn’s sons. He
knew French splendidly well, was involved in literary writing,” and published articles
under a pseudonym.120
Peter O.: News About Russia
Announcing himself as “the half-literate peasant, P.” who “Belong[s] in body to a
landlord,/But in soul, to Christ,” the anonymous author of News About Russia declared
his status as bonded yet “free” before God, asserting his own sense of what “freedom”
meant. A poem of over 250 stanzas of varying lengths, News About Russia was given to
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the post office in St. Petersburg in 1849, to be sent to Prince Petr Georgievich Ol’
denburskii, kin of Nicholas I and reputed to be “liberal-thinking,” according to MacKay.
Finding it suspicious, the post office intercepted the package, and for the next year it
ended up in the undelivered mail that was to be burned. Opened just before it was to be
put in the flames, as required by the rules of the “dead letter” office, readers of the poem
in the package deemed it “blameworthy” and turned it over to the notorious Third
department, in charge of “political investigation and surveillance.” The poem remained in
the files of the department, not surfacing again until the soviet era.121
“The peasant P.” intended for the poem to be read by Nicholas I, stating on the
cover of the notebook in which he wrote that he wished to “dedicate my verse to the
sovereign emperor Nikolai,” with the condition that “he read everything contained in the
manuscript,” and he agree to “not prosecute the writer.”122 The “news about Russia” that
the peasant P. wanted to inform Nicholas of was, in effect, a petition appealing to the
emperor to deliver enserfed peasants “from this bondage into a proper life.” The author
embedded in a sprawling account of life in his village and peasant commune deep
grievances against landlords, his own and those that he heard of in his travels between his
home village and “the city,” Instead of a petition, the peasant P. had apparently taken the
stratagem of dedicating a poem to the emperor because prohibitions against petitioning
the sovereign were well known. In the poem, the father of the central narrator, Peter O.,
cautioned against attempting to speak to the sovereign: “Is it for the likes of you, my son,
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to approach the tsar?/Is it for you to advise the great one/ … In dull and colorless
words?” The tsar would ignore the petitioner, or worse, his father warned: “he’ll think to
send you off/To a place where not even the ravens /Bother to carry off the bones.”123
Peter O. began the poem by describing the thwarted and unhappy life of serfs. The
father of the author was “a man of ambition” who “went off in search of arts and trades”
when young. Disappointed in this endeavor, “he abandoned himself/To dissipation,
drunkenness.” His mother, after “earlier, happy years,” which were passed in prosperity,”
now lived in poverty. At the age of fifteen, P. received permission to “live and work in
the city,” most likely St. Petersburg, where he found its “populous throng … like a
forest.” Giving a clue to how city life might have changed him, the poet wrote: “there I
came to know/Different people, another world,/And resolved to write these ‘news.’”124
On his first journey back to the village after seven years in the city, Peter O. was
“carried away by such a joy” at the thought of going home. Sailing on the Neva River,
the river running through St. Petersburg, and its canals, he admired the beauty of the
fields and meadows ashore, “natures kingdom” that “the almighty in heaven/watches
over.” But he lamented “the decrepit settlements” of the inhabitants, and “the ill-fated
Muzhiks [male peasants].” This glaring difference led him to call his reader to “Observe
the dominance of earthly powers/And the false splendor of their homes.” Taking a break
from his journey at a village stop to change horses, “the author P.” met a horse keeper, an
old man, who spoke of his fate as being “born into the world in chains.” Impoverished by

123
124

Peter O., “News About Russia,” in Four Russian Serf Narratives, 62, 74-75.
Peter O., “News About Russia,” in Four Russian Serf Narratives, 41-42.

79

taxes and the obrok he owed his landlord, the horseman declared, he was forced to “work
and work.” Throughout the poem the author condemned the burden of obrok, which he
broadly defined as, in addition to the due in money and kind (quitrent), all of the fees,
levies, and extortions collected by the landlords, for “the peasants call it all the same
‘obrók.;” The poet found the labor due, barshchina (corvée), no better. According to
Stepan, a character whose view the author purported to transmit “word for word,” the
landlords “wear the people down with bárshchina,” and, leaving the peasants little time
for their own plots of land, forced them to “plow in the rain,” cut short their planting
season, and lose part of their harvest.125
And yet the author took pride in the agricultural success of the empire. Along the
Volga, “o holy river—” and the next big leg of his journey after the fluvial network of the
river Neva, the author saw “caravans [of riverboats] filled with grain,” a sight he
wondered at and “could not look at … /Without tears of joy,” for “Russia had been so
long under threat of famine. [Now] there’s lots of grain in Russia.” Grain, pronounced the
author, was “better than gold.” Welcomed by his waiting family and neighbors when he
arrived home, the author heard of the neighbor’s complaints of “the incomes taken from
us by force!” and the “ruinous” payments the landlords extracted. At this, the author
returned to his anger against the injustice of the “earthly powers.” The author’s father
pointed to the pain and humiliation meted out to peasants by the gentry in his
reproach/Against ‘our’ law,” The father intoned: We see how the noblemen regard the
peasant/As a fool, use ‘peasant’ as a term of abuse—/They use the same word to revile
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their enemies/Through us they are rich, at us they rage.” More seditious than this
reproach of injustices and mistreatment were the father’ speech a few lines later,
suggesting a demand for equality and rejection of social hierarchy: “But what do they
have that we don’t have?/ Look, and you’ll see that in feeling and desire/They’re exactly
the same as we are.”126
The poem is replete with the author’s appeals for freedom conveyed through
various characters. Contrasting the justice of “the law of God” to the injustice of “our
law,” the father’s oration continued: “And what must we put up with now?/God gave us
minds and fields of earth/But there’s no exit out of the fortress (sic, should be “contract”
or “deed”) doors/From this bondage to a proper life.”127 Repeating a similar contrast,
Peter O., riding on a cart on the last leg of his journey home, compared the beauty and
splendor of the surrounding land to the privation of the region’s inhabitants, “living
together in a wasteland, in homes half-ruined.” His driver, asked by the author how
things could have gotten as bad as they were, replied, describing what was apparently the
effect of seasonal and longer-term migrations: the locals had ”scattered … in all
directions,/Leaving behind homes, wives, children,/They dwell in foreign lands, always
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at work, never a bright day,/And tolerating much sadness.” But the driver blamed this sad
situation on the noble’s greed for obrok, and by extension, serfdom, “the evil fate of
horrible slavery.” The author asked the driver what could be done for the people, and the
driver replied “Freedom,/For tsar and Christian alike a single law!” 128 That is, freedom,
for Peter O., meant ending the contradiction between God’s law and “our law.”
Aleksandr Nikitenko: A Freed Man’s Story
The account of his life by Aleksandr Nikitenko (1804-1877) is that of someone
who obtained his manumission in 1824. It is the completed portion of and autobiography
that Nikitenko began in 1851 but did not finish, given the title Up from Serfdom, the
memoirs’ translator Helen Saltz Jacobson undoubtedly suggests a Russian counterpart to
Booker T. Washington’s 1901Up From Slavery. Nikitenko attained a high degree of
success in his life after his manumission, becoming a government official and a professor
at St. Petersburg University, one of the two top universities in the Russian Empire, with
the other being Moscow University. 129 Nikitenko was born in the Voronezh Province in
the village of Alekseyevka, in the southwest borderland of the Russian Empire. The
Alekseyevka Sloboda (village) was an estate that belonged to the Sheremet’ev family,
whose numerous estates had at that time altogether about 150,000 male serfs, according
to Nikitenko. His father, Vasily Mikhailovich Nikitenko, was educated by the
Sheremet’ev family, and began doing clerical work for the family at a young age and
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became chief clerk of Alekseyevka Sloboda, his home village. Vasily Nikitenko and his
family moved frequently, as Vasily’s outstanding capability as estate manager was in
demand and landed him jobs at various estates, and he takes many jobs during
Nikitenko’s childhood. Nikitenko started studying at his village school, and continued
with his education at the country school in Voronezh. There he impressed his teachers
with his ability and earned good marks. Unable to go on to attend high school due to his
legal social status as a bonded person he returned to his family, now residing in
Ostrogozhsk, a prosperous trading town in the Voronezh Province. There, at the age of
fourteen, Nikitenko was given a position as a teacher at the country school in
Ostrogozhsk, which he called “a comparatively good one” among many country schools.
This was a highly unusual arrangement, which Nikitenko explained by the “strong spirit
of opposition” that characterized “Ostrogozhsk society,” leading it to “shun official
teachers” certified by the government.130
Nikitenko met and developed close friendships with leading members of the
educated in Ostrogozhsk, including military officers who were veterans of the
Napoleonic War, among them General Dmitry Mikhailovich Yuzefovich. Not long after
meeting him, General Yuzefovich offered the sixteen-year -old Nikitenko a position as
the tutor of his two nieces, asking that Nikitenko move to Elets, to which the General was
assigned. Elets was a commercial center and “one of the finest country towns” in the
region, according to Nikitenko. In Elets, Nikitenko met and became good friends with
members of the high-ranking nobility, who would later become his advocates in his bid
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for manumission.131 Nikitenko first confronted, at thirteen, the “terrible curse that hung
over me because of my social status, which later … almost drove me to suicide.” When
he graduated from the country school in Voronezh, he discovered that his legal status as a
bonded person prevented him from being admitted to high school, the next level of
education, even as a sympathetic teacher wished to help him by taking the dangerous risk
of lying about his status registration in government documents. Nikitenko noted the
precarity of the recognition he enjoyed in the elite social circles of Ostrogozhsk and
Elets. In Elets, Nikitenko became “more and more aware of my status as a non-person”
after General Yuzefovich, in an uncharacteristic outburst, snapped at Nikitenko for
forgetting his social place, reminding him that he “possessed neither moral or [sic]
corporeal rights,” meaning legal social status, to such higher aspirations as literary
ambition.132 Back in Ostrogozhsk after leaving General Yuzefovich, Nikitenko started his
own school, which enjoyed great popularity in town. But here too he sensed the
insecurity of his position. At a public event a “rival,” according to Nikitenko, accused
him of being a “tramp” and “self-anointed teacher” who “insolently intrude into the ranks
of official teachers” open only to those in the unbonded social estates categories. This
attack led Nikitenko to become “obsessed” with “my cruel fate” and “tormented by the
thought that the law was still against me, and any day I could become a victim of
unforeseen, hostile circumstances,” he wrote. Admitting that “my craving for freedom
and knowledge and for expanding the range of my activities possessed me to the point of
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physical pain.” Nikitenko, interestingly, invoked the empire’s recent enemy, Napoleon,
who stood as a symbol of social mobility for many in the lower social ranks. Had
Napoleon, while still at military school, said “that he expected someday to be an emperor,
he would have been sent straight off to an insane asylum,” Nikitenko noted. Conceding
that “I’m no Napoleon,” and that “my claims are surely more modest. I’m not dreaming
about a crown, but only a seat at the university,” Nikitenko nevertheless made the
comparison to Napoleon to draw out how difficult it was for him to acquire a higher
social position, even though his exceptional talents should have easily qualified him for
it.133
Resolved to obtain his freedom, Nikitenko wrote a letter to his landlord, Count
Sheremet’ev, appealing for his manumission. The Count replied early in 1821, rejecting
Nikitenko’s appeal with the comment “Not worthy of attention”. Nikitenko finally won
his freedom in 1824, after gaining the support of Prince Golitsyn, the Prince, according to
Nikitenko, “felt that my case was worthy of attention.” Increasingly besieged by the
social pressure exerted by Prince Golitsyn and other supporters of Nikitenko’s cause in
high society, as Nikitenko related it in the final chapter of his memoir, titled “My
Struggle for Freedom,” the count at last relented and released Nikitenko from bondage.134
Nikolai Shipov: Liberation Through Captivity (ca. 1852)
The memoir of Nikolai Shipov (1802-?), titled “the Story of My Life and
Wanderings,” was published in 1881 in the journal Russkaia Starina, (Russian of Yore)
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with a preamble by the author. The memoirs purported to cover the years from his birth
to 1862, although events recounted ended with 1852. Shipov was manumitted in 1845, in
the midst of the Russian Empire’s war in the Caucasus. Shipov obtained his manumission
thanks to a legal statute that stipulated that, according to Shipov, enserfed peasants
captured by the region’s “mountain plunderers,” that is, resisters and bandits who fought
against Russian forces, were to be emancipated upon their escape from captivity. Daniel
R. Brower and Susan Layton refer to Shipov’s unusual path to freedom as “liberation
through captivity,” which, as they point out, was linked to Russia’s conquest of the
”imperial borderlands” of the Caucasus.135
Nikolai Shipov was born in 1802 in the village of Vyezdnaia in the Nizhnii
Novgorod Province. His father was “a landlord’s peasant,” as Shipov described him, on
an estate belonging to the Saltykov family, who were absentee landowners. Shipov’s
father was a successful cattle tradesman who “also dealt in tallows, fur, and skins.” His
father took Shipov on long journeys to purchase cattle in the steppe provinces of
Simbirsk and Orenburg, whose local inhabitants included Muslims and Turkic peoples
such as the Bashkirs, the Chuvash, and the Kazakhs. Beginning at age six Shipov was
taught to read and write by the local priest, and later, after the cattle trade picked up again
following the War of 1812, Shipov was taught the “secrets of his trade” by his father.
According to Shipov, his father was “a literate and erudite man, honored and respected by
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all,” and “we the Shipovs were a wealthy family, one of the foremost in Vyezdnaia.” No
doubt because of his standing in the village, Shipov’s father was “more than once” given
the onerous job of estate bailiff, responsible for collecting taxes and obrok from the
villagers. 136
Adept at keeping accounts, Shipov included in his memoir frequent references to
sums paid, received, or offered. Shipov related that for the years between 1820 and 1828,
the landlord decided that the entire estate of Vyezdnaia owed “105,000 ruble assignat per
year” in obrok. As one ruble assignat (paper ruble), according to Thomas Owen’s
calculation, was at that time roughly one-fourth of a silver ruble, this converts to about
26,250 silver rubles, still an enormous sum. During those years the obrok Shipov and his
father were required to pay was five-thousand rubles per year (presumably also in
assignat), on top of which they had to pay 800 rubles assignat per year for “the right to
conduct trade.” Another peasant in in Vyezdnaia “paid nearly 10,000” rubles (also
assignat, presumably) per year in obrok, Shipov noted, as compared to the “110 rubles
assignat per year” in obrok set in general for ”each” ‘census soul’ (ravizskaia dusha)” in
the village, that is, each male adult peasant registered since the latest census.137 For the
Shipovs, the heavy burden of the obrok was not lightened by the landlord even in the
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years when the family suffered “significant loses” from trade and faced the threat of
“soon be[ing] completely ruined.” The weight of the obrok, Shipov wrote, led “well off
peasants [to attempt] to but their freedom,” such as in the case of “one very rich peasant
who … offered the landlord 160,000 rubles to manumit him and his family.” In Shipov’s
own case, he and his father made a plea to the Saltykovs to free Shipov in exchange for
50,000 rubles assignat and a pledge that his father “would remain a serf,” despite the
increasing troubles directed at the father by the Saltykov’s estate manager and a rival
villager. The landlord denied these requests for manumission as a rule, Shipov wrote,
while his own request was “categorically refused” by the estate manager even before it
reached the landlord. It was at this point, in late 1830, according to his memoir, that
Shipov started to look elsewhere for a way out of his condition: “I began considering
running away,” and “to try my luck in some alien land.”138
In late 1831, told that he still owed an unpaid amount in obrok of 1,500 rubles
assignat, Shipov left for St. Petersburg to plea with the Saltykov’s estate manager for a
reduction in this sum, “Nothing, of course,” came of this, Shipov wrote, other than
rumors that his property was to seized and he himself sent away to the army. These
rumors deeply worried him, for “anything can happen to an enserfed slave—such were
my thoughts at the time.” In January 1832 Shipov fled his village with his wife to the
borderland region of Bessarabia, by the Danube, to join his brother-in-law Stepan Lanin,
himself a fugitive who left his home village five years before. Lanin, who worked in
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Bessarabia as a sutler provisioning the local Russian garrison, procured forged papers and
false passports for the Shipovs. In the Molavian city of Batashany, near Bessarabia and
inhabited by Moldovians, Jews, and persecuted Orthodox Christian sectarians such as the
Old Believers and the Skoptsy, as well as Russian peasants, Shipov visited the bazaar and
looked to reprise trading.139
“A year passed … and I traded peacefully,” wrote Shipov. The Shipov’s growing
family stayed in a city near Kishinev (in today’s Moldova), and then in Piatagorsk, a city
in the Caucasus, a region that, according to Brower and Layton, saw “a ‘flood’ of illegal
(‘passportless’) migrants” since the start of the empire’s Caucasus War.140 Shipov’s
pursuers were not far behind. The new bailiff at Vyezdnaia sent an agent to look for him,
and offered 1000 rubles for his capture. Shipov was apprehended, returned to his home
region, and incarcerated. Having avoided the harsher punishment of exile to Siberia,
Shipov received, following a petition on his behalf, the lighter sentence that had him “reinstalled with my landlord.”
By early 1842, Shipov was again allowed to travel. He left for Moscow, and then
journeyed to the city of Kherson (in today’s Ukraine, near Crimea), and the busy port city
of Odessa, and to Kishinev. In Kherson, he met up with a cousin who obtained his
freedom through the military. Of his cousin, Shipov wrote, “although he was a soldier, he
breathed freely.” He saw his own plight in stark contrast, for his was “a miserable
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existence, like a blade of grass all withered from lack of rain. And why? Simply because I
wanted freedom above all else: because I sought … my and my prosperity’s
independence from, that cruel-hearted landlord.141 In 1843, Shipov made a hugely
important discovery as he was “pursuing [a] case” through the legal channels to recover
his property from his uncle, with whom he had left it for safekeeping. Among the law
books given him to read by a “civil servant,” Shipov found, in what MacKay clarifies as
the 1832 and 1842 Law Codes, statutes that pointed to a path to manumission unknown to
him. According to Shipov, the statutes stated that “serfs who were captured by mountain
plunderers would be free along with their family upon escaping from captivity. Those
freed serfs would then have the opportunity, within nine months of escape, of selecting
whatever life and type of work which best pleased them.” At this point, in Shipov’s
telling, “I decided … to attempt this severest of remedies, if only that I might be rid of
the barin’s [the landlord’s] power over me.” 142
Taking what little money he had, Shipov obtained a passport and travelled to the
Caucasus region in early 1844, and again engaged in trading, this time by selling goods to
the Russian regiment stationed at the fort of Vnezpanaia. He deliberately took risky night
journeys, and, was caught by the so-called “mountain plunderers,” a band of Chechens
who was allied with Shamil, the best-known of the warriors fighting against Russian
forces in the region. Shipov was held for ransom. Less than two weeks later, with the
help of a Tartar who fell in with the Chechens, Shipov made a daring night escape back
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to the Russian fort of Vnezapanaia where he had been a sutler. One month later, while in
Stravropol, a major Russian-controlled city in the Caucasus, “to find out the prices of
cattle,” Shipov submitted his petition for “my liberation from the landlord’s
proprietorship” to the magnate there, “along with the attestation of my captivity.”
Shipov’s captivity by the Chechens attracted the attention of Count Mikhail Semenovich
Voronstov himself, the Viceroy of the Caucasus and the commander of the Russian
forces in the region.143 On a visit to Fort Vnezapanaia, the count, according to Shipov,
“spoke very affectionately with me and asked about my time in captivity,” and
commended Shipov with the words “well done!” In October 1845, seven months after his
petition, Shipov “receive[d] certification of my manumission” at the “Regional
Government Office,” and was at last released from his bondage. Trying to read the
certificate aloud to his friends, Shipov wrote, “tears of joy confounded my vision, and I
couldn’t make out a thing.” Shortly after his certification as a freed man, he travelled to
Kherson to join his cousin, and to register as a member of the city’s legal estate (soslovie)
of the meshchane (lower-rank townspeople), an estate that included many merchants. In
Kherson, Shipov was reunited with his family, all of whom now belonged to the
meshchane estate.144
Saava Dmitrievich Purlevskii: Commerce and Freedom (ca. 1868)
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The unfinished autobiography of Saava Dmitrievich Purlevskii (1800-1868) was
first published in the Russkii vestnik (the Russian Messenger), whose editor N. Shcherban
received the manuscript from an acquaintance who was “a great friend of the deceased
author.”145 Purlevskii was born in the Yaroslavl province in a village named Velikoe,
around 100 miles northeast of Moscow. According to Boris Gorshkov, translator of the
memoir, this was a region where the majority of the inhabitants worked in kustar
production, characterized by artisan crafts and cottage industry, and earned their livings
as small tradesmen. Purlevskii stated that the estate that included his village originally
belonged to the “sovereign court department,” meaning that the inhabitants were state
peasants then. But, he wrote, it was “probably” Catherine II who gifted the estate to a
prince, who was benign and worked alongside his serfs to improve the estate’s villages
and surroundings. The prince, in need of money, according to Purlevskii, offered freedom
to the peasants his entire estate, “2,500 souls” in all, for sixty thousand rubles, or twentyfour rubles per soul. But the estate’s peasants could not come up with the sum. The estate
was sold instead to a merchant, ‘not a nobleman,” wrote Purlevskii. Gorshkov explains
that the sale of the estate was likely in 1780. In 1790, as Purlevskii related it, the heir of
the new owner imposed an obrok due that “seemed quite burdensome,” putting “our
elderly people almost in tears” as the recalled the prince’s offer to set the entire estate
“free forever.” This story of the elder’s regret and those of the village’s increased obrok,
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which Purlevskii heard in childhood, “reinforced my belief that peasant dependence was
bitter!” the author asserted.146
In the next segment of the memoir, however, Purlevskii seemed to turn away from
the idea that obtaining formal and legal “freedom” was necessary for peasants to avoid a
life of “dependence.” Listing the advantageous features that made commercial activities
flourish in his village, he noted that it was centrally located, had “twice-weekly markets,”
a two-week fair around harvest time, and “the villagers’ own sharpness.” Describing the
villagers of his grandfather’s time, “as serfs belonging to the same person who paid a set
rent and worked only rarely for the lord and who were therefore not overworked,”
Purlevskii contended that “our predecessors possessed full freedom to develop their own
economic life.”147
Purlevskii’s grandfather, Petr Petrovich Purlevskii, traded in flax and yarn, which
he sent to the northern port of Arkhangelsk, and in linen and canvas, which he directed to
Moscow. His grandfather’s “finances reached twenty thousand [rubles],” which was,
Purlevskii observed, “a great sum in those times!” Petr Petrovich was elected estate
bailiff, a position that in Purlevskii’s telling reflected the respect and stature the
grandfather commanded among the peasants. As bailiff, Purlevskii’s grandfather put in
“good order” the estate’s affairs, “introduced bookkeeping,” and started a credit pool for
the estate’s peasant commune that enabled them “to sell their goods at distant
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markets.”148 Purlevskii’s father, Dmitri Petrovich Purlevskii, as Purlevskii told it, was an
“excellent” trader who had “his own money” and the confidence of the people he dealt
with. “Our house was the finest in the village,” Purlevskii recalled, and the family had
two servants, one of whom “lived with us for about thirty years.” His father, the author
remembered, enjoyed “the best” relations with the landlord, to the point that the landlord
“empowered my dad to administer the estate and represent him in courts and juridical
institutions.” But this responsibility often took Purlevskii’s father away from his own
business, as it frequently required him to travel. Purlevskii recollected that at age seven
he began attempting to learn on his own the rudiments of reading and writing. Soon after
his father sent him to the parish priest to study, and himself taught Saava “basic
accounting and business.” But, according to Purlevskii, his father “expressed sorrow” that
Saava could not study “grammar, writing skills, and arithmetic,” because at the time
“serfs were not accepted into [city] schools,” where those subjects were taught.149
Purlevskii was still a boy when his father passed away and his family’s economic
standing declined. The next year, 1812, was that of the Napoleonic War, as a result of
which, as Purlevskii remembered it, “commerce had declined everywhere” while the
costs of basic goods rose. “We managed to keep up,” Purlevskii said of his family, and he
himself took up trade, although this remains at a small scale until his marriage. He was
married at eighteen to the only daughter of Petr Ivanovich, a “fellow-villager” who was
“loved” by his employees and “respected” by the landlord, who entrusted to Petr
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Ivanovich the job of transporting to St. Petersburg the iron produced at the landlord’s
Siberian Metallurgical mills. Subsequently, Purlevskii would be given a similar
responsibility by a later landlord who inherited his village: to transport the mills’ iron
products to the great fair at the city of Nizhnii Novgorod. After his marriage, and aided
by his father-in-law in his business, Purlevskii sensed “as if I had obtained some
particular right,” and “felt secure in having such a father-in-law on my side.” His thought
now turned to “achiev[ing] for myself, at any cost, the standing that my grandfather and
father enjoyed.”150
Purlevskii related many stories of landlord’s abuse of the power they wielded over
their peasants. Some of these stories he heard and might have been part of local lore,
while others he himself witnessed. Among the stories he heard might have been one
reflecting the cruelty of a neighboring landlord, who set his hunting dogs on a serf boy
for a minor offense. Apart from possibly hearsay tales, Purlevskii’s own experience also
provided many instances of landlord’s inhumanity and excesses. In 1817, a year before
Purlevskii’s marriage, the estate’s landlord demanded that all the estate’s peasants pay
their dues two years in advance, placing a huge financial burden on the village, and
threatening to send those who failed to pay in full to the army. Sometime later the
landlord commanded that “four tall men no older than twenty” and “four beautiful
eighteen-year old girls” be sent to him in St. Petersburg, the men for serving as footmen,
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and the women for purposes that Purlevskii did not bother to explain. Purlevskii, thanks
to his family’s connection to the bailiff, managed to avoid being selected.
In 1820, the estate’s new owners announced to the estate peasants that they
wished to both raise the dues and collect these dues ten years in advance, an exorbitant
sum of “two hundred thousand rubles [to be paid] right now.” As Purlevskii recounted it,
the peasants refused the heirs’ demand because they did not have this much money. The
heirs then “mortgaged the entire estate of 1,300 serfs to the Council of Trustees for
twenty-five years,” passing it on to the government’s guardianship for that duration in
exchange for 325,000 rubles. The estate’s peasants, in return, were to foot the cost of this
mortgage plus interest in their rent, which came to thirty thousand rubles per year.
Adding this amount to the taxes and fees they owed, the peasants’ annual dues totaled
fifty thousand rubles. This turn of events, and the “huge obligation” they resulted in,
“shocked” Purlevskii and posed an “extraordinary concern to everybody,” he wrote.
Purlevskii explained, “this obligation seemed unlawful. But what could one do? In those
days peasants were prohibited from complaining against their landlords.” He continued,
“willfully refusing to pay the lord would mean stamping ourselves with the stigma of
rebellion,” and lead to “harsh punishments, which would reduce everyone to complete
impoverishment.” Given this bind, Purlevskii saw that “the only consolation was our
unrestrained freedom to engage in economic activities.” But it was also because of this
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shocking outcome of events, according to Purlevskii, “for the first time in my life, I tasted
the sorrow of my status as a serf.”151
The estate to which Purlevskii’s village belonged to comprised in all of twentythree villages, in addition to a cotton factory, where the estate’s peasants worked to pay
their barshchina (labor due). Working conditions were poor, however. The factory’s
“German manager,” hired by the landlord, “kept [the peasants] downtrodden in every
way” and replied to peasants’ complaints with flogging, wrote Purlevskii. That year,
faced with peasants gathering to speak to him of their distress under his management,
according to Purlevskii, the manager reported the gathering to the provincial governor as
a mutiny, and brought the troops down on the estate’s peasants. This attempt by the
manager to charge the peasants with mutiny was dismissed by the provincial authority
upon inquiry. But, expressing his view of the enserfed peasants’ precarious and
unpredictable life, Purlevskii commented: just as “everything seemed to have happened
for the better, [it] then turned out for the worse.” The manger again accused the peasants
of rebellion, and this time, the provincial garrison occupied the estate’s villages and
rounded up a large group of peasants. “I myself was a witness of this,” wrote Purlevskii.
He described the heart-rending scene that followed: the younger ones, about a hundred in
number, were “given a sound whipping,” which they endured silently. “Those who were
stronger tried to protect the weaker ones and stepped forward. Women cried sorrowfully,
children screamed, I am barely able to retell what I saw … the representative of the
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authorities themselves turned away their faces and lowered their eyes.”152
Although Purlevskii deemed that the peasants’ “guiltless suffering” in this
instance was not in vain, as it caused the German manager to be replaced by “a Russian, a
kind and indulgent man” who made numerous changes that benefitted and enriched the
peasants, this episode “revived my old desire to free myself and my family from
bondage.” 153 In his telling, Purlevskii first seriously considered purchasing his freedom
after the 1820 incident when the sudden and steep increase of the estate peasants’
obligations made him aware of “[the landlord’s] power over us and the humiliating, slave
like condition of all society,” presumably because he saw “all society” through the lens of
his own social position. Earlier, Purlevskii wrote, his “life objectives” pointed to attaining
a prominence and prosperity comparable to his “fellow-villagers,” now he was
preoccupied by “thoughts about my serf status.” By 1826, successful in trade, Purlevskii
had enough money for “buy[ing] one’s way out of serfdom.” But he did not act on
realizing “this cherished idea” at the time, since he found that being a serf did not hinder
“the freedom of my commerce and my access to loans,” and because he preferred,
Purlevskii sort of admitted, not taking ”the money necessary for buying my freedom” out
of his business funds. The harsh punishment of the estate’s peasants in 1828 pushed
Purlevskii to make a bid for purchasing his freedom. But this bid was refused, according
to Purlevskii, because the landlord decided the estate could not lose someone of
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Purlevskii’s abilities, and prohibited further talk of his redemption. Deeply disappointed,
Purlevskii accepted this outcome with “a heavy heart.”154
Having gained their trust, Purlevskii was given positions of great responsibility by
his landlords (by then there was more than one), as the new estate bailiff, and as the
supervisor entrusted with selling the iron produced at the landlord’s Siberian mills at the
annual fair in Nizhnii Novgorod, the largest fair in the empire and, in the second half of
the nineteenth century, “the largest in Europe.” 155 As the estate bailiff, put in charge of
estate business, and of the peasant commune that adjudicated the affairs of the peasants,
Purlevskii, by his own account, acted to meet the commune’s needs. He first put the
peasants affairs in order, then, with funding provided by the landlords, and “without the
slightest {financial] burden on the commune,” built a communal school, as none had
existed, and a “medical facility” with a salaried physician, who “taught several boys
pharmaceutics and nursing arts.” As the supervisor of the landlord’s iron sale at Nizhnii
Novgorod, Purlevskii acquitted his duties so well that he gained “the landlord’s
appreciation” along with a monetary reward. His “self-esteem” so boosted by this, wrote
Purlevskii, “that I nearly gave up my idea of redeeming myself from serfdom.”156
But, once again reminding Purlevskii of the precariousness of whatever success
he achieved because of his serf status, he soon ran into trouble. “Everything was fine”

154

Purlevskii, A Life Under Russian Serfdom, 96-97, 101-102.
Catherine Evtukov, “Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society, and Civilization in NineteenthCentury Nizhnii Novgorod (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2011), 73. And Anne Lincoln
Fitzpatrick, “The Great Fair: Nizhnii Novgorod, 1840-1890 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
156
Purlevskii, A Life Under Russian Serfdom, 103-107.
155

99

until 1830, when a missed shipment of iron caused his landlords, influenced by
Purlevskii’s adversaries, the author suspected, to dispatch an inspector to check on his
business conduct. By his own account, Purlevskii, believing “my case to be just,” ignored
his adversaries’ “attempts at extortion” in exchange for directing the investigation in his
favor, with the result that he was summoned to St. Petersburg, where one of the landlords
was residing, “to explain things in person.” Here the memoir ends abruptly, at the
moment in 1831 just after Purlevskii entered the study of his landlord, a certain General
A., with the words: “There, my future fate was settled, so I will relate our conversation in
detail …,” which the author did not manage to do.157
What ensued in Purlevskii’s life was supplied in 1887 by N. Shcherban, the editor
of the journal that published Purlevskii’s memoir based on what “people well acquainted
with [Purlevskii]” told the editor. Shcherban suggested that Purlevskii’s conversation
with General A. did not go well, leaving Purlevskii with the thought that despite his
innocence he was to face a humiliating penalty of corporal punishment, or exile to
Siberia. “On th[e] very day” of that conversation, according to Shcherban, Purlevskii
took flight, heading first to Moscow, then to Kiev, and finally to the Bessarabian region
in the southwest, which also harbored Shipov and his wife some years later. Like the
Shipovs, Purlevskii was also sheltered by the Skoptsy, Christian sectarians who believed
in self-castration. Fearing forced conversion by his benefactors, according to Shcherban,
Purlevskii fled the Skoptsy and took refuge with the Nekrasovtsy, a branch of the Old
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Believers that settled in the Kuban region, by the Black Sea. In 1834, learning of the
imperial decree that granted, in Shcherban’s words, “all runaway serfs who committed no
crimes {the right] to settle freely in the Novorossiisk area” by the Black Sea. Purlevskii
“immediately went to Odessa,” the center of that region, and “obtained the status of
townsman,” meaning he was able to register in the estate category of meshchane, which
effectively turned him into a free man. In Odessa, Shcherban informed the readers,
Purlevskii resumed trading, this time in sugar, and prospered. Having done very well in
his business and his “position … solidified,” Shcherban wrote, Purlevskii was able to
move up another rung and register in the merchant (kupets) estate, a coveted status for
traders. Shcherban traced Purlevskii moving to Moscow in 1852, and redeeming his son’s
freedom in 1856. Perhaps to emphasize the hardship Purlevskii endured fighting to obtain
his liberation, Shcherban wrapped up the final period of Purlevskii’s life with what the
editor said was Purlevskii’s reaction to the manifesto for the liberation of the serfs issued
in 1861 by Alexander II, “the empire’s reformer!”: Purlevskii, now “[an] old man …
without saying a word, dissolved into tears.”158
The memoir of M.E. Vasilieva came out in Russkaia Starina (Russia of Yore) in
1911, although, according to MacKay, whether it was penned before or after the 1861
Emancipation Edict is unknown. The memoir is unusual in that it was written by a serf
woman, and told from a child’s perspective Her story is also rare in that it illustrated the
life of one of the dvorovye, or (household serfs), enserfed peasants who were put on
domestic duties by landlords, and did household chores ranging from gardening, horse
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grooming, driving carriages, and cooking, to serving as valets and keeping company with
the landlords’ children. Introducing the memoir, MacKay comments that unlike other serf
narratives, Vasileva’s did not include “comparisons between a previously enslaved and
currently free condition,” an omission that resulted, in his view, a “harsh reflection on the
harshness of authority and submission,” a harshness that was unsoftened by a portrayal of
submission as a “performance for authority,” which might have suggested the serfauthor’s agency. Also absent in her narrative, as MacKay notes, were “‘abolitionist’
imperatives,” since the Vasilieva did not show “the child-serf [to be] bent toward some
future moment of liberation.” In other words, as Gorshkov might put it, her narrative did
not take up a “language of freedom” often present in other serf writings.159
Vasilieva, known by the diminutive of “Akul’ka” in the memoir, was born in an
estate called Dubovoe, near Moscow, that belonged to the noble family she named
“Bolotin,” an alias. In a wording that suggests Vasilieva wrote this memoire after
emancipation, she described her “former barin (lord),” or landlord, Petr Georgievich,
“compassionate to his peasants.” But his wife Varvara Ivanova, “a Circassian princess,”
according to Vasilieva, “was a beauty on the outside but had a cruel heart.” Vaselieva
explained that she was orphaned at the age of five and brought to “Granny Ustina,” who
was tasked with raising the estate’s orphans. Vasilieva related that her early childhood
was pleasant and she did not suffer from want. Describing this period, she wrote of
herself and other orphans that “our lives were good.” As Vasilieva told it, life at the
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estate became more onerous for its peasants and herself when the landlord decided to
return to Dubovoe with his family to reside there full time, instead of only paying
periodic visits.160
Although she described the arrival of the family as having made the barin’s
resident village in the Dubovoe estate “more cheerful,” Vasilieva emphasized the
hardship the villagers had now to endure, not by referring to peasant obligations, but by
turning to the character traits of the landlord’s family for explaining its violent behavior
toward peasants. Vasilieva’s account of these character traits very much falls into line
with the persona of the willful and unbridled pomeshchik and landlord depicted by
Radishchev and by the Consensus Historians. Vasilieva presented the barin‘s elder
daughter Praskov’ia Petrovna as kind, someone who “would intercede on behalf of the
servant girls” even though she always received slaps from her mother for doing so. But
the barin’s son, a sixteen-year-old, and his second daughter, the youngest of the three
children, were selfish and inhumane. “Nasty, capricious,” the younger daughter, Son’ia
Petrovna was “hated by all the domestics,” as a word from her to her mother would lead
to a beating by birch rod of the accused wrongdoer, According to Vasilieva, Son’ia’s
whims and demands, as Son’ia took a liking to the serf girl after chancing upon her, were
what caused the author’s childhood self, Akul’ka, to be brought into the barin’s house to
be raised as Son’ia’s companion. The young lord Egor Petrovich was, as Vasilieva
remembered him, “the very picture of a barin: tall, slender, with black arching
eyebrows.” He, the author recalled, was arrogant and sadistic, as he would walk past the
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house serfs without noticing them, and liked to kill small animals, which he did with
Akul’ka’s cat in front of her.161
Devoid of the “language of freedom,” Vasilieva’s memoir emphasized instead the
abuses of the landlords. Vasilieva’s memoir comprised in effect a catalogue of cruel acts
perpetrated by the landlord’s family, although it is not entirely clear how many of these
she herself experienced and witnessed, and how many were hearsay. Among the acts of
violence she experienced were, aside from the killing of her cat by the young master,
being punished in the young mistress’s stead as her study companion. For example, when
Son’ia failed to learn her lessons, Vasilieva wrote, the barin’s wife would take hold of
Akul’ka and “beat me until I bled.” Another act of cruelty and disregard she witnessed
occurred, according to Vasilieva, on the first day of her arrival at the barin’s house to
serve as Son’ia’s playmate. She saw the barina (the lady) about to bathe. The barina
appeared in full nudity before her menservants and refused to cover herself when asked
by her husband to do so. To the barin’s mild rebuke, “there are men here,” Vasilieva
wrote, the mistress remarked: “What men? ... Here are my serfs, … They’re no more to
me than those two chairs over there.”162
Of the stories that the girl Akul’ka heard, probably because they circulated in the
estate, was one about the discovery of a body immured in the barin’s house, suggesting
that her landlord’s father, said to be a favorite of Catherine II, murdered a serf, if not
more than one. Another was that of the young barin setting the beard of the well-loved
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estate steward (bailiff) on fire, to take revenge on the bailiff for stopping him from
tormenting servant girls. The mistress apparently enjoyed causing pain, like her son. Of
the barina’s penchants, Vasieliva wrote that “she passionately loved beating children,”
and dealt with serf children who approached the manorial courtyard by “beat[ing] them
until either they either turned blue from crying or fell silent and stupefied.” Yet another
instance of the mistress’s inhumanity Vasilieva recounted was that of a young gardener,
Seriozhka, who out of hunger took a “half-eaten bun” from the mistress’s plate when she
briefly left the dining room by the garden. Caught sight of by the mistress just as he was
taking the bun, Seriozhka took flight, and leapt into a well to evade his pursuers.
Vasilieva’s memoir ended with this tale, stating that hearing of Seriozhka’s death, “all the
house serfs wept and said in a single voice: “A person has died for a few crumbs of
bread!” 163
In Vasilieva’s account, tales involving cruel and blood-thirsty masters were
common, and good masters, like Akul’ka’s landlord Petr Georgievich and his elder
daughter Praskov’ia Petrovna, were both uncommon and ineffectual in preventing the bad
ones from terrorizing peasants. The picture of serfdom Vasilieva offered was that of
shocking violence. But between the lines, there seem to be views and impressions that
remained unsaid by the author. For instance, recalling how she romped about the estate
with the other orphans, she mentioned the children being allowed into the manorial house
by the kindly bailiff. Inside the house, Vasilieva wrote, speaking for the child Akul’ka,
“we thought we’d landed in heaven.” At this point the adult author’s voice came through
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as she described what gave the children this impression: the master’s house, apart from
being huge and bright, had “parquet floors, gilded furniture, and marble columns in the
hallway.”164 The girl Akul’ka had learned to read and write as well as dance alongside the
young mistress, and these lines suggest that growing up, Vasilieva became accustomed to
having in her surroundings costly materials, such that she was able to name them
precisely.
More than the other serf authors reviewed in this chapter, Vasilieva might have
tailored her reminiscences to readers’ expectations in the post-emancipation era to see
serfdom as simply an evil to be condemned rather than an institution to be investigated
and analyzed. Unlike the other serf narratives discussed in this chapter, Vasilieva’s
focused showing of serfdom’s evils, does not reveal very much about her thoughts and
personality. And unlike these other narratives, it does not say much about how serfdom
worked in the rapidly changing social, political, and economic world of Russia in the
nineteenth century by showing how the enserfed might have adapted to this changing
world.

Freedom and Unfreedom
The literary accounts in this chapter, both fictional and memoirist, all invoke the
idea of freedom. The serf memoirs show that many among the enserfed, the authors
themselves and the people they spoke of, were allowed both physical and social mobility,
contrary to the image of serfdom presented by Radishchev and the Consensus Historians.
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This brings up the question of what “freedom” meant for those who lived the life of
bonded people, and those who contemplated this life as outsiders. This chapter shows that
while some voices among the enserfed thought of “freedom” as the liberation of all
peasants in bondage, such as Petr O., who asked “But what do they have that we don’t
have?” that justified the submission of one group of people to another, other voices, such
as that of Smirnov and Nikitenko, spoke of freedom mainly as an individual quest
impelled by their own exceptional talent. For Nikitenko in particular, what distressed him
was not the oppression reflected in the extraction of labor obtained through obrok or
barshchina, but the unpredictability, insecurity, and precarity of life that came with being
a legal “non-person,” as he put it. With regard to the extraction of labor in relation to
serfdom, the personal accounts collected in this chapter raise the question of the boundary
between freedom and unfreedom, as the authors, when they were serfs, were literate and
sometimes highly educated, had access to a range of occupations outside agricultural
work, and often traveled. The extent to which serfdom in Russia represented the unfree
pole in the dichotomy of free and unfree labor, and the validity of this dichotomy itself,
as insisted on by the Consensus scholars, but questioned by the Revisionist historians,
will be examined in the next chapter, which places Russian serfdom in the global context.
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CHAPTER IV
LABOR EXTRACTION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
This chapter will examine serfdom in the Russian Empire in connection to a range
of methods or systems in other parts of the world that were set up for procuring labor,
both “free” and “unfree.” The chapter will focus in particular on the so-called “long
nineteenth century,” which began in the late eighteenth and ended in the early
twentieth.165 The long nineteenth century saw the expansion of the world market and the
deepening of global economic ties, along with a phenomenal growth in the global
demand for consumer goods and industrial raw material. While this was an era that
ushered in political movements that, appealing for mass support and mass participation,
promoted ideas and ideologies invoking “freedom,” it was also a period that saw the
emergence of new ways to capture and extract labor, whether it was called “free” or and
“unfree,” in response to the immense new labor needs created by the acceleration of
industrialization and the ballooning demand for new commodities. This chapter begins
with an examination of the terms “second serfdom” and “second slavery,” as these terms
point to labor formations that are often seen as the prototypes of unfree labor in the
modern era.
“Second Serfdom” and “Second Slavery”: Common Views of Unfree Labor
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The term “second serfdom” has commonly been used by scholars taking a
Western Europe–centered view of historical evolution to refer to the enserfment of
peasants in certain regions, such as Eastern Europe and Russia, that occurred centuries
after serfdom had ceased to exist in another region, namely Western Europe. While a
review of the formations of bonded labor across the world may prove this timeline to be
overly reductive, rather than filling in on this timeline, this chapter will focus on the
arguments presented by scholars who refer to this term, and another related to it, “second
slavery,” in order to contrast these arguments with those that question the interpretations
of labor formations these terms suggest.
The notion of “the second serfdom” usually refers, according to Alessandro
Stanziani, to “the recrudescence of corvée [labor obligation] in Eastern Europe and
Russia from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries.”166 The comparative study
of serfdom by Jerome Blum, the Consensus Historian discussed in Chapter I, even though
it does use the term “second serfdom,” is devoted to explaining the central problem
defining this term: serfdom’s “recrudescence” in the eastern part of Europe, after having
disappeared from Europe’s western part. Starting first with the situation in Western
Europe, by which he largely means England, France, the western German states, and
Flanders, writes that in the twelfth century the majority of peasants there were serfs, but
that a century later, many serfs had become free. In England for example, he states,
between one third to one half of its peasants were free by the turn of the thirteenth
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century, and in France at that time serfs comprised a minority among peasants. By the
late sixteenth century, Blum notes, “all, or nearly all, of the peasants … were entirely
free” in many parts of Western Europe, and those who were not completely free saw their
bondage to the seigneurs significantly weakened. Blum attributes the reasons for this shift
toward greater freedom to the economic expansion in Western Europe during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, which was reflected in the increase in population, growth of
cities, the increased expansion of arable land, the growing use of money, as well as the
rise of the prices of agricultural goods. These changes, according to Blum, spurred
landlords to both convert labor dues to money dues and to increasingly make concessions
to peasants, effectively turning their serfs into “free tenants” who were “paying a money
rent” as early as the end of the thirteenth century. But if economic expansion contributed
to this movement toward greater freedom, so too, in Blum’s view, did the severe
economic contraction of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that hit most of Western
Europe. This was because the downturn, according to Blum, not only significantly
brought down grain and land prices, and led to a sharp decrease in tilled land and to
abandoned rural holdings, but also resulted in a drop in population, and thus a serious
labor shortage. Blum contends that the labor shortage forced up wages while inducing
landlords to offer more concessions to peasants, such that “remarkably enough, the
process of emancipation … was continued” from the time of economic expansion into
“these hard times.”167
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Turning eastward to beyond the River Elbe, which for Blum marks the dividing
line between Eastern and Western Europe, his study shows a dramatically different
picture, In Eastern Europe, which the authors understands as roughly comprising of
Prussia, Bohemia (today’s Czech Republic), Poland, Livonia (today’s Estonia and
Latvia), and Russia, the non-noble population was made up of both “free cultivators,” or
“free men,” and “the unfree,” with the “free” population of peasants being entitled to
certain rights, such as the “hereditary right to their holdings.” However, Blum argues,
unlike what occurred in Western Europe, a contrary trend emerged in Eastern Europe,
one that led “toward the loss of [peasants’] old freedoms,” such that by the late fifteenth
century “from the Elbe to the Volga, most of the peasantry were well on their way to
becoming serfs.” For Blum, the key moment separating Eastern from Western Europe
was the economic depression of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which struck both
parts of Europe, and it was in their response to the depression that “East and West
followed diverging roads, one leading to more serfdom and the other to freedom.” In
Blum’s view, whereas landlords in Western Europe dealt with the slump by offering
higher wages and concessions to peasants, to alleviate the resulting labor scarcity, the
nobility and gentry east of the Elbe, faced with the “depopulated villages and empty
homesteads” and the ensuing labor shortage, reacted by imposing heavier duties on
peasants and restricting their movement.168
Blum attributes this divergence between East and West to several factors: that the
landed nobility and gentry, in Prussia and Poland for instance, were becoming more

168

Blum, “The Rise of Serfdom,” 813, 819-821.

111

politically powerful relative to the sovereign and to other corporate groups; that more
landlords in this period, in Prussia for example, were “becoming producers for the
market,” and therefore preferred labor dues and tying peasants to land, over money dues
and permitting peasant mobility; and that the East, unlike the West, saw “the decline of
the cities and of the urban middle class,” by which Blum presumably means the absence
of a bourgeoisie that could challenge the nobility.169 As this pattern does not fit the
situation of Muscovy, since the boyars were weakened in this era, Blum provides a
modified set of reasons to shoehorn in the Muscovite case. “In Russia,” he writes, “a
strong central power emerged” from the turbulence of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries “in the persons of the princes of Moscow.” The princes, to defeat the great
nobility, relied on and raised the lesser nobility to political prominence.170 By pointing to
the rise of the lesser nobility instead of “the urban middle class” in the wake of the upper
nobility’s defeat, as was the case in Western Europe, Blum is thus able to cover the
Russian case with his general framework for Eastern Europe, for in Russia too, it was the
nobility’s hold on political power, and the successful pursuit by the lesser nobility, the
pomeshchiki, of its interest, that led to the gradual enserfment of peasants, as Chapter I
shows.
Summing up his explanation for the different developments in approaches in the
“East and West” in regards to peasant freedom, Blum stresses two critical points.. One is,
as mentioned above, the political rise of the noble estate, which gained increasing power
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over the peasants, being consented to by the central authorities, gave even more
jurisdiction over the peasants. As a result, Blum writes, “Eastern nobility, in pursuit of
what it conceived to be its own interests, was able to establish economic and social
control over the peasantry and to dominate over the townsmen,” since in these parts of
Europe the nobility was not only empowered to control peasants, but also acquired the
commercial rights usually held by merchants and traders. Intertwined with this point is
another, what Blum observes as the overall decline of in cities and the nobility’s
domination over townspeople, the precursor of the “urban middle-class.” As a result,
according to Blum, in Eastern Europe, including Russia, “an important bourgeoisie class
failed to develop.”171 In short, Blum, echoing many Cold-War era Western scholars who
consider the rise of the bourgeoisie as indispensable to the development of political
freedoms, explains Eastern Europe’s “second serfdom,” and its failure to embark on the
road to freedom, by the absence of a bourgeoisie and the prevailing of the nobility over
other social estates. Implicit in Blum’s explanation for the emergence second serfdom in
Eastern Europe is the region’s backwardness in historical development in contrast to
Western Europe, seen specifically in the economic and political failures of “the East”
brought on by a missing middle class and by the consolidation of power by the nobility
and the central state. In this view of second serfdom, the use of forced labor is associated
with a failure to become part of the “modern” world spearheaded by developments in
Western Europe.
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The term “second slavery” as Dale Tomich and Michael Zeuske note, “suggests
an analogy with the ‘second serfdom.” But, in fact, while both terms point to a common
historical development, the increased use of coerced labor in the modern era, this analogy
breaks down in the way scholars who refer to these terms envision what is “modern.”
Tomich and Zeuske define “second slavery” as the “systematic redeployment and
expansion of Atlantic slavery during the nineteenth century,.” and opposes it to “the more
common view that chattel slavery was … an archaic institution that was incompatible
with modernity, that was condemned to extinction after the advent of industrial
capitalism, modern political regimes, and liberal ideologies.” For Tomich and Zeuske, the
very concept of the “second slavery” itself brings attention to the substantial economic
expansion in the Atlantic world between 1780s and 1840s, which “resulted in the decline
of old zones of colonial slavery and the formation of highly productive new zones of
slave commodity production.”172 In other words, whereas critics of “second serfdom” like
Blum see “unfree” labor as incompatible with modernity, researchers of “second slavery”
such as Tomich and Zeuske find the coercion of labor to be part and parcel of the modern
world, as it underpinned the modes of economic expansion that defined modernity.
Peter Kolchin, like Blum, asserts a clear distinction between free and unfree labor.
In his comparative study of slavery in the American colonies and serfdom in Russia,
Kolchin places both squarely in the category of unfree labor, as in his view “both were
preeminently systems of forced labor.” Even though he does not use the terms “second
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serfdom” and “second slavery,” Kolchin considers these two forms of labor extraction to
be similar, or “analogous,” as Tomich and Zeuske might word it, in that both were
connected to economic changes beyond the local level. Kolchin further asserts, like
Blum, a distinction between slave labor in the New World and the steady loss of rights
among the peasantry in Eastern European lands in conjunction with the growing power
the planter and landowning classes in the Atlantic World and Eastern Europe, both of
which he broadens into a difference between Europe proper, consisting of “the more
economically advanced nations of western Europe,” and its periphery, comprising of the
colonies of the European empires and “the eastern European countries from the Baltic to
the Ukraine.” Kolchin sees a “remarkable growth in the use of unfree labor” at “Europe’s
borders” in response to the labor shortage that followed the European geographical and
economic expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his view, this growing
reliance on unfree labor “stood in marked contrast to its continuing decline in … western
Europe.”173
Kolchin’s comparative study covers from the origins of both institutions of labor
and how they hardened into “preeminent” forms of forced labor by the nineteenth
century. Looking at the European colonies in North America, Kolchin writes that at the
beginning of the colonies’ expansion, Europeans were easy to attract to meet the
colonies’ labor shortage because of the favorable wages offered. But this source of labor
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was neither permanent nor hereditary, and it was at times difficult to control, especially in
the case of runaways. The colonists started transporting Africans to North America “as
early as 1619,” at first at a trickle. But by the period between 1680 and 1730, the use of
“the forced labor of blacks” to supplement “that of whites [European indentured servants]
in Virginia,” for instance, took increasing hold, such that, according to Kolchin, “slaves
became the backbone of the labor force in the [colonial American] South.” In this period,
the colonies’ planters grew more prosperous exporting various cash crops, such as grain,
rice, and tobacco across the ocean to the European market. Their rising wealth, as
Kolchin notes, allowed them to purchase more enslaved Africans, and thereby entrench
the use of slave labor in agricultural production for export.174
Drawing an analogy between the North American colonies and the Muscovite
territories, Kolchin states that in Muscovy there was also “considerable production for
market among seventeenth-century landholders,” observing that “any surplus [over what
peasants consumed] was available for sale.” He points to the capacity to produce for the
market of serfs in both private and monastic estates across “different districts of Russia”
by noting that it was they who brought “a wide variety of food items—butter, eggs,
chickens, geese, sheep, fish, and the like—to the nobleman’s table in Moscow.” Although
producing a surplus that could be sold on the local and regional market does not quite
equate with producing cash crops for the world market, and although, as Kolchin admits
in an endnote, “Russian exports in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” were “minor,”
Kolchin’s insistence that both peripheries faced comparable pressures allows him to
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argue for the similarity of each periphery’s response to these pressures, slavery
serfdom.175
The first conclusion Kolchin draws from his comparative study is the equivalence
of North American slavery and Russian serfdom. Kolchin writes that “Russian serfdom
was a very particular type of slavery, with features that in many ways resembled those of
America’s ‘peculiar institution’ [of slavery],” even though he acknowledges that
“Russian serfs were able to lead lives that … were much more independent than those of
American slaves.” Citing Consensus scholars such as Blum as his source, Kolchin asserts
that the eighteenth-century pomeshchik had as much power “over his serfs … as that of
the American slave owner over his chattel—almost total, short of deliberate murder.” So
great was this power, according to Kolchin, again citing scholars like Blum, that “serfs
could be bought and sold, traded, won and lost at cards. They were, in short, personal
property.” Kolchin offers that his view concurs with that of Lenin, who saw no difference
between a serf and a slave; that of Blum, who finds the eighteenth-century Russian serf to
be “scarcely distinguishable from a chattel slave; and that of Alexander Gerschenkron,
who declares that in Russia “serfdom had … degenerated into outright slavery.”176
The second and less explicit conclusion that Kolchin makes is that the use of
unfree labor lies outside of the core of Europe and was not inherent to the modern era, as
unfree labor became common only at the borders of the European “core,” and at a time
before there was “a system of values” that found coerced labor objectionable. That is,
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Kolchin suggests that acceptance of unfree labor was part of a premodern viewpoint, for
“until the middle of the eighteenth century … slavery and serfdom created few moral
problems for anyone.”177 In taking this stance regarding the relationship between coerced
labor, modernity, and core European values and practices, Kolchin largely agrees with
Blum. This chapter’s next section will turn to scholars who challenge these views.
Unfree Labor: Revisionist Views
Writing on serfdom in Russia in the broader context of labor bondage in Eurasia,
Alessandro Stanziani identifies “conventional approaches” to comparing slavery and
serfdom as those that are informed by “ideal types [meaning theoretical definitions]
rather than historical realities.” By referring to “an ideal definition of each term” that are
deemed to include such shared features as “the lack of legal rights allotted to slave and
serfs, their hereditary statute, the master’s right of ownership, and the coercive extraction
of surplus,” Stanziani states, these approaches end up confirming that slavery and
serfdom are almost the same.178 Historical realities, however, as Stanziani argues and as
explored in Chapter II and Chapter III, show serfdom in Russia to be in practice more
flexible, and more likely to allow for the enserfed to obtain a different legal status, than
what serfdom’s formal restrictions might suggest. The flexibility of serfdom in practice,
and its evolution toward including more flexible obligations over time, is one of the key
findings of Revisionist Historians such as Stanziani.
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But even with regard to formal legal definitions and restriction, Russian serfdom
differed from slavery in the Americas in substantial ways. One critical distinction, which
Kolchin mentions but does not judge important, is that, as Stanziani writes in his review
of Kolchin, “unlike slaves, serfs were attached to the land,” and not legally considered to
be the personal property of the landlords. Another major distinction, Stanziani notes,
citing the influential historian Michael Confino, is the autonomy of peasant communes
and the function of the commune as an entity of peasant self-government. These
distinctions, as Stanziani observes in his sum-up of Confino, are among the reasons why
“the master-slave relationship did not find an equivalent in Russia, where the peasant
commune and its elders mediated the relationship between the estate owners and the
peasants.” Relaying Confino, Stanziani writes, “the Russian master was therefore much
more obliged to negotiate peasants’ services than was the American slave owner.” Going
beyond Confino, Stanziani further argues for other significant divergences between
slavery and serfdom, pointing to the relationship between enserfed peasants and the state,
to the extent of economic autonomy peasants had, and to the peasants’ participation in the
empire’s territorial expansion. “Unlike American slaves,” Stanziani writes, “Russian
peasants constantly brought judicial litigation” against their landlords, “developed their
own economic activity,” which they pursued by “pay[ing] fees to their masters,” and
helped consolidate Russian territorial gains in the steppe and in Siberia by settling in
these regions beginning in the seventeenth century. Challenging Kolchin, Stanziani

119

concludes, “it makes no sense to consider American slavery and Russian serfdom to be
similar institutions.”179
To say that serfdom in Russia and slavery in North America were not alike not
only undermines the assertion of scholars like Kolchin, who see both as “preeminently
systems of forced labor,” but also raises the question of where exactly the boundary
between “free” and “unfree” labor is to be located. Active since the post–Cold War era,
more recent scholars, unlike Blum and Kolchin, query the division between the West and
the East (or the non-West), and that between modernity and the premodern age, divisions
that Blum and Kolchin mapped on to the geography of where “free” and “unfree” labor
can be found. These scholars of more recent comparative studies, including Stanziani,
show that there was no clear-cut line between free and unfree labor in the period of global
economic expansion during the long nineteenth century. They find that alongside serfdom
in Russia and slavery in the Americas, other significant forms of coerced labor existed.
They also find that labor bondage continued to exist after formal emancipation, providing
an important source of labor feeding economic demand across the world.
What was remarkable about the nineteenth century, usually seen as that of the
peaking of the modern era, was that slavery in the Americas was entrenched, and new
forms of coerced labor were devised both as supplement to and, after its abolition, as
replacement for slavery . Serfdom in Russia, by contrast, as Chapter II shows, was slowly
shifting toward more flexible arrangements and permitting an increasing number of
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enserfed peasants to be manumitted. Regarding slavery, as Dale Tomich mentions, there
is a common and persistent “presumption that slavery is incompatible with the modern
world.” He argues against this presumption, and against “a type of domino theory” that,
viewing “Britain as the harbinger of a modern political, economic, and ideological
order,” insists that “once Great Britain abolished the slave trade [in 1807], the fate of
African slavery in the Americas was sealed.” Tomich shows that interpretations of
slavery, or unfree labor, as giving way to free labor as the nineteenth century unfolded
are erroneous, for it was during this “anti-slavery century” that slavery reached “the
apogee of its development.”180
Enrico Dal Lago, looking to the nineteenth-century Atlantic plantation systems in
the U.S. South, Brazil, and Cuba, and to the landed estate systems in Russia, Spain, and
southern Italy, concurs with scholars such as Tomich and Zeuske that slavery and the
modern era proved to be fully compatible, as reflected in the increased use of slave labor
to meet the expanding cash crop production for export. Dal Lago notes in addition that in
addressing the labor shortage due to the growth of world commodity markets,
landowning agricultural producers relied not just on slave labor, but also on other forms
of coerced labor, such as that of tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and indentured workers.
According to Dal Lago, the technological innovations of the nineteenth century that
constituted the hallmark of modernity also profoundly reshaped both the supply of
agricultural exports and global demand, by making possible the mass production of
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exports for distant markets. For instance, the broad use of cotton gin in the U.S. by the
1790s, and the widespread adoption of the steam-powered mills on sugar plantations in
Louisiana from the 1820s onward, Dal Lago writes, “heralded the massive expansion of
the ‘Cotton Kingdom’ in the … Old Southwest,” and “increased enormously the
production of sugar” by Louisiana’s planters. Together with mechanization, many
slaveholders also adopted new techniques of factory management “to enforce the
regimentation of labor” of their enslaved workforce, according to Dal Lago. Finally, the
arrival of railroads and steamboats, nineteenth-century emblems of progress, along with
the extensive infrastructural construction reaching into continental interiors and
connecting land and sea routes, allowed planters to vastly increase the surface area of
cultivation and rapidly transport remote plantations’ output to metropolitan centers.
Thanks to these changes, Dal Lago points out, such cash-crop producers as the Brazilian
coffee plantations and Cuban ingenios (sugar mills), became the world’s leading
suppliers of coffee and sugar as early as the 1830s and the 1840s, respectively.181 The
success of these producers in turn led to further production expansion, new demands for
labor, and efforts to intensify labor extraction.
In the U.S. antebellum South, in the cotton fields as well as the sugar- growing
areas in Louisiana, for instance, “the exhausting ‘gang-system’, as opposed to the more
humane ‘task-system,’” was adopted to maximize productivity and “improve
rationalization of labor management,” Dal Lago writes. In nineteenth- century Brazil,
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coffee planters implemented a mixture of the “gang system” and the “task system,” that,
according to Rafael de Bivar Marquese, imposed “an incredible amount of work on
slaves.” Interestingly, added to this mixed system of labor intensification was the
Brazilian planters’ attempt to use not only force and coercion, incentives to heighten
productivity. The planters, according to Dal Lago, “paid in monetary terms those slaves
who worked beyond their minimum required tasks.”182 In the Cuban sugar plantations, by
1847, four decades before the abolition of slavery in Cuba, there too was a mixed system
of labor, in this case a mixture of slaves and workers “hired … as indentured servants,”
Dal Lago shows. On these plantations, the “hired” workers, who were “Chinese coolie
laborers” recruited from coastal China, often by deceit, worked alongside the enslaved of
African descent; both groups “worked in gangs (cuadrillas),” supervised by overseers
and drivers who used meted out severe punishments to force the work-gangs to keep pace
with what Robert Paquette calls the “factory-like rhythms” of the plantations’
mechanized sugar mills.183
The use of indentured labor was a common method taken up by planters and
colonial authorities for filling the labor needs of new territories. According to Richard
Allen, “the migration of 400,000 to 460,000 or more mostly British indentured ‘servants’
to North America and the Caribbean between the 1640s and 1775 established the
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precedent for the indentured labor trades that flourished during the 19th and early 20th
centuries.” Indentured migrant laborers became more important after the 1807 abolition
of slave trade in the British Empire, and still more so after 1834, the year of the
emancipation of slaves in the empire. Allen points to, for example, “the arrival [in the late
1820s] of approximately 4,600 Chinese and Indian workers in the Mascarene Islands of
Mauritius and Réunion,” and “the introduction of large numbers of indentured Indians
into Mauritius beginning in 1834-1835.” Allen also notes, however, that the migration of
indentured laborers began earlier than these seeming watershed moments. The British
Empire’s agents recruited Chinese immigrants to work and live in the British Indian
Ocean settlements prior to 1800. As early as 1806, British authorities recruited and
transported 200 Chinese immigrants to Trinidad. By the early nineteenth century, about
10,000 to 12,000 Chinese were migrating to Southeast Asia every year. According to
Allen, the French colonial empire similarly sought indentured labor for its colonies, in
this case through contractual agreements called the “engagé system.” By the mid- to late
1820s, 3,100 Indian laborers were recruited as engagés for Réunion, and between 1849
and the 1880s, about 79,000 Indian engages were sent to the island. Allen suggests that
the drive to increase the use of indentured labor came in part from British abolitionists,
who, in their “desire to bring an end to slavery,” also pushed for the recruitment of
indentured workers in order to “demonstrate[e] the superiority of ‘free’ over slave labor
in the production of tropical commodities.”184 But as Dal Lago shows in his review of the
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Cuban ingenios, the indentured Chinese workers there, treated as harshly as the enslaved,
often rebelled against and resisted the plantation management, and probably did not serve
to showcase to colonial employers the abolitionists’ ideal image of “free” labor.
Notable in this nineteenth-century era of technological innovation and market
expansion was the growing need of not just labor, but cheap labor. This was as true for
the “Atlantic Plantation System” of the Americas as for the “European Landed Estate
System” of eastern and southern Europe, according to Dal Lago. This chapter will skip
over Dal Lago’s conclusion regarding “second serfdom” in Russia, his representative
case for Eastern Europe, as it relies on Blum and Kolchin, and repeats these scholars’
view of the equivalence of slavery and serfdom without taking into account the more
recent historiography, presented in Chapter II, that challenges this view. In contrast to his
dated treatment of serfdom, Dal Lago’s survey of the latifundia (large landed estates) of
the European South usefully shows how in a setting where labor was “free” and for hire,
as opposed to enslaved or enserfed, instituting coercive methods to push down labor cost
remained common practice.
If the Americas’ “commodity frontiers,” as Dal Lago calls the cash crops
undergirding the continents’ expanding agricultural production, were “cotton, sugar, and
coffee,” the “commodity frontiers” of Europe were “grain, olive oil, citrus, and wine
grapes,” a great portion of which was grown in the latifundia of Spain and southern Italy.
The “abolition of the feudal system,” by which Dal Lago presumably means the abolition
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of hereditary forms of bondage tying peasants to the land and their landlords, occurred in
southern Italy in the early nineteenth century, and in Spain in the 1840s. Thus, as Dal
Lago points out, the southern Italian and Spanish peasants cultivating the latifundia were
“legally free,” yet remained heavily exploited by the latifundia owners, as peasants after
gaining their “freedom” had little access to land and scant chance of becoming
landowners themselves. Called braccianti in Italy and jornaleros or eventuales in Spain,
peasants who became landless day laborers filled “a very large reservoir” of the
latifundia’s casual workers, whose employment was largely seasonal and dependent on
the commercial needs of the “orange groves, olive tree fields, and vineyards” that hired
them. Less casual, but equally vulnerable was the labor of sharecropping tenants, as the
land rental leases they signed “could easily become instruments of exploitation in the
hands of ruthless landlords,” Dal Lago writes, as the leases allotted land to tenants for ten
to fifteen years, after which, “just as the plants began to have fruits,” the land would
revert to the landowners and deprive the tenants an equitable share of their decades-long
labor.185
The trend toward using labor that was “free” in legal terms, but in practice
maintained through coercion, began before the “emancipation” of unfree labor,
exemplified by employment of indentured Asian migrants, and continued after
“emancipation” was instituted, as Dal Lago shows for the latifundia of south and
southwestern Europe starting in the early nineteenth century. Similarly, after slavery’s
abolition in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, between the 1860s and the 1880s, this
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trend of employing nominally “free” labor that was maintained through coercion
persisted.
On the cotton plantations in the post-emancipation U.S. South, Sven Beckert
writes, the abolition of slavery did not end exploitive and brutal labor practices, as “new
forms of labor” arose with “new forms of coercion, violence, and expropriation.” In
1866, right after emancipation, planters in Georgia and North Carolina, for instance,
began hiring on contract the newly freed slaves to cultivate the plantations and paid
wages. The pay, in money or in crop shares, was minimal, and the work onerous. Under
these terms, the plantations’ workforce, now freedpeople, continued to “liv[e] in the
hovels they had inhabited before emancipation,” cultivating and maintaining the
plantations supervised by overseers, according to Beckert. The post-emancipation era’s
new legal codes worked in conjunction with the terms of the freedpeople’s employment
contract to discourage mobility and hold them to the plantations. In Mississippi, a few
months after slavery’s abolition, for example, as Beckert shows, “so-called black codes”
were passed that inserted into the contracts freedpeople were to sign terms that “defined
mobility as ‘vagrancy,’” which worked to fix the emancipated labor force in place,186
With tenuous access to land and subsistence crops, Beckert notes, freedpeople
were forced to accept sharecropping agreements that pushed them to grow cotton in
exchange for a share of the cash crop. These agreements often deepened their dependency
on planters, who charged “exorbitant” rates for necessities and supplies, leading
sharecroppers to fall into constant indebtedness. Sharecropping quickly replaced the
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“gang labor” common in the pre-emancipation days, according to Beckert. By as early as
1868, sharecropping contracts were “widespread” in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta, and the
turn of the twentieth century, “more than three-quarters of all black farmers in Arkansas,
South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia were sharecroppers,”
Beckert writes. The economic constraints built into the contracts, buttressed by legal
codes, political disenfranchisement, and outright violence, including lynching, Beckert
shows, brought on a situation that “all but certain” compelled Black farmers “to grow
cotton,[even as] growing cotton would create poverty.” By the 1900s, Beckert concludes,
the freedpeople forced into growing cotton by a myriad of economic, political, and
coercive set-ups “still lived in grinding poverty with few rights and no political voice.”187
Examining the “boundaries of freedom” in the post-emancipation sugar industry
in the Americas, Rebecca J. Scott finds that in Cuba, Brazil, and Louisiana, compared to
the plight of the enslaved in the pre-abolition era, the freedpeople “were differently
situated in terms of access to productive and organizational resources,” which allowed
them to better protest against the inequities imposed by the plantation owners.
Nevertheless, every gain was achieved only through prolonged struggle and negotiation.
Well into the early twentieth century, as Scott shows, a substantial number of freedpeople
remained impoverished due to the terms of the labor contracts and the political
interactions that became “imprinted” into the “socio-political environment” of sugar
production in these regions.188
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Different from cotton growing, for which tenancy and sharecropping were the
most common forms of labor arrangement in Louisiana, as in other parts of the U.S.
South, in the sugar industry “wage labor … was the overwhelming pattern for African
Americans in the Sugar Bowl,” Scott writes. This pattern resulted from the planters’
preference for “long-term contracts that ensured gang labor,” and from efforts to
“replicat[e] … the longstanding racial divide” that left what Scott calls “semiindependent cane farming” to white farmers. Thus, within a decade of emancipation, not
only were post-emancipation African Americans in sugar cultivation overwhelmingly
wage laborers, but wage labor on the plantations consisted in turn predominantly of
African Americans. In 1887, between 6,000 and 10,000 cane field workers in the
Terrebonne and Lafourche parishes stopped work in protest against planters’ intent to
reduce wages and pay in scrip. At the Lafourche parish seat of Thibodaux, aided by the
state’s militia, local whites siding with the planters went after the strikers and executed at
least thirty Black men they believed took part in the strike. The killings that came to be
known as the Thibodaux massacre broke the strike, chased out labor organizers, and
“politically silenced” Louisiana’s sugar workers for decades afterward, according to
Scott.189
In the Spanish colony of Cuba, there were about 173,000 enslaved people as of
the 1860s. Between 1880 and 1886, the year of slavery’s formal abolition, colonial
administrators devised the half-way institution of “apprenticeship” as a transitional
measure to prepare for abolition. By these pre-emancipation years, about 100,000 gained
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freedom by various means, such as “self-purchase, flight, lawsuits, and individual
negotiations,” with the push to manumission coming from the “determination of slaves,
apprentices, and [anticolonial] rebels,” Scott writes. After emancipation, the formerly
enslaved often became colonos (cane farmers) who signed contracts with sugar
plantations’ highly mechanized mills to process and transform the cane they harvested
“into a saleable commodity.” The colonos became by force of these contracts dependent
on the ingenios, and Scott describes their type of labor as more “a kind of ‘contract
farming’” than tenancy. The colonos were not a majority among the plantations’ postemancipation workforce. In Cuba as a whole, due both to the importation of indentured
workers and to the difficult access to land in some regions, “most people of color labored
for wages.” Where the colonos did flourish, it was often because they managed to obtain
some land, grow subsistence crops on their little plots, and in that way “avoid complete
proletarianization,” Scott observes. However, their life remained precarious, for “the
plantation hands,” as a 1902 report referred to the colonos, “are not assured permanent
employment,” which “leads them to depend upon the products of [their] garden patches
and other small holdings … and to limit their needs to what these can supply.”
Interestingly, the North American author of this report found that this predicament turned
the colonos into “a less reliable source of labor.” As Scott notes, reflecting on this report,
the colonos’ “reduced ‘needs’” and their “unreliability” constituted for them “a
longstanding survival strategy.”190
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The sugar-growing region of northeastern Brazil, although “eclipsed” by the
coffee-growing regions of the Brazilian south, still had “hundreds of thousands of slaves”
as of the 1870s, according to Scott. Since then many of them were sold to coffee
plantations, and a number was manumitted as the Brazilian sugar industry declined, beat
out by Cuban plantations on the international market. Despite sugar’s decline, the
majority of the enslaved in the region were not freed until 1888. On the eve of the
emancipation in 1888 there remained 77,000 enslaved people in Bahia, and 41,000 in
Pernambuco.191
In the transition toward the post-emancipation era, the sugar industry devised
what Scott identifies as “hybrid work forms” that included the use of cane farmers
(lavradores de cana) on contract. These forms of labor, she notes, offered the industry
“considerable flexibility,” as they required comparatively little cash outlay while keeping
on hand “a reserve force of potential laborers.” After emancipation, the situation of the
lavradores de cana resembled that of the colonos. “Like the colonos in Cuba, their
wealth, status, and racial categorization varied, and the term lavradores de cana initially
included landowners, renters, and sharecroppers,” writes Scott. In Brazil, a greater
portion of former slaves became cane farmers than in Cuba, and along with cane
furnishers (fornecedores de cana) who purchased cane from the farmers for the large
central mills, the lavradores de cana made up “a rural middle group, some in decline and
some in ascent,” Scott points out. Nevertheless, the general trend for the formerly
enslaved was toward wage labor rather than tenancy, and the rural population to which
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they belonged became “as a whole … extraordinarily poor and hungry.” According to
Scott, few of them were able to “become share-tenants in cane …, and fewer still made it
to the next rung.” In 1922, a Brazilian government report showed that day labor was
widespread in rural Bahia, with laborers working por empreitada (by the job), receiving
at times money, at times only “food and merchandise” as pay. In Pernambuco wages
were lower relative to Bahia, another study shows, as migrants from the Brazilian interior
competed against Pernambuco’s laborers for employment.192
Thus, from emancipation’s immediate aftermath to decades after, even the least
proletarianized of Louisiana, Cuban, and Brazilian sugar plantation laborers remained
impoverished, dependent on the plantations, and hardly a model of the ideal of “free” and
independent labor that inspired the anti-slavery movement.
“Freedom” and “Unfreedom,” or Inequalities?
Noting the post-emancipation predicament of former slaves and wage laborers in
cash-crop production, many scholars characterize this era’s wage and indentured labor as
resembling slavery, since “free” labor turned out to be in practice merely a “legal
fiction,” as Alessandro Stanziani puts it when he conveys this view. Stanziani objects to
this characterization of the near equivalence of slavery and indentured and wage labor,
for it “deprives the abolition of slavery of any historical significance,” and overlooks the
agency of indentured workers who fought to assert what rights they had. In addition,
because this characterization pivots between the poles of “freedom” and “unfreedom” in
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its depiction of labor types, Stanziani suggests, it fails to capture the spectrum of varying
coercive relationships that developed between planters and laborers, both in the time of
slavery and afterwards. He argues instead for an interpretive approach questioning the
notion of a clear distinction between free and unfree labor, a notion that permeated
historical debates and current scholarship alike,193
In place of presuming a dichotomous division between free and unfree labor,
Stanziani turns to examine the legal inequalities that shaped labor relationships,
expressed in different types of labor contracts. Stanziani argues against taking for
granted, as do many scholars of labor and capital in the West, the vision of an “abstract
wage earner” as the representative figure of “free labor,” a figure that arose from an
idealized conception of the “free labor market,” where “legally equal actors” signed
contracts that all parties could invoke the law to enforce. Stanziani asserts that such a
figure did not exist in historical reality, as the legal codes of Europe in the pre- and early
industrial eras were replete with built-in inequalities between workers and masters, and as
demonstrated by the experience of historical actors. He proposes, rather, that it was the
figure of the “the servant” that exerted a real historical impact in shaping labor relations.
In the legal codes and contracts of France and Britain, which Stanziani investigates, those
who sold their work or labor were treated as “servants,” a status group that had very
restricted legal rights and little say over labor contracts. But these contracts were not
entirely a “fiction,” since over time, through legal and extralegal struggles, laborers were
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able to modify the contract terms and the extent of their rights, in part by making claims
based on the rights already defined in the contracts.194
In the case of France, the revolution eliminated the old regime and removed
criminal sanctions against workers built into their contracts, but left in place “significant
contractual inequalities” favoring employers that endured into the third quarter of the
nineteenth century, according to Stanziani. Among the different types of laborers entering
into contractual agreements with employers, aside from day laborers, who were often
seasonal workers, were “servants in husbandry,” who tended to be more closely tied to
their masters, sometimes living with them and performing domestic services. These
“servants” earned wages (gages), and were repeatedly considered by French law, in 1848,
1849, and 1850, to have the legal standing of a worker who “voluntarily subordinates
himself to the master,” in the words of the judicial documents Stanziani quotes; this
means that the master had, therefore, by law the right to make many decisions that
affected the condition of the servant. Stanziani suggests that the wage-earning servant
was the model for indentured workers in the French colonies. The indentured laborers
sent to these colonies in the seventeenth century signed contracts of engagement that
were based on “already existing contracts” written for agricultural laborers and sailors,
and that specified, since they were old regime contracts, that the engagés were “subject to
criminal penalties” for breach of contract, and to “be[ing] transferred along with their
contracts to other masters.”195
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Regarding Britain, the author points to labor codes assembled in the sixteenth
century that lasted into most of the nineteenth. These codes governed the relationship
between masters and the workers who provided services to them, variously designated as
servants, artificers, and apprentices. Collectively referred to as the Masters and Servants
acts, these rules were supplemented by the Statute of Artificers and Apprentices of 1562.
Defining in effect some of the key terms that indentured contracts would be modeled on,
as Stanziani notes, the Masters and Servants acts and the Artificers and Apprentices
statute gave “apprentices, servants, and any other type of wage earners” fewer rights than
their masters and employers, and therefore also “an inferior legal status.” These legal
measures, in Stanziani’s words, identified as “fugitives” those “who left their
employment without giving notice,” and granted masters the right to recover
‘“fugitives.”’ These measures further conferred on the master a broad range of other
rights, including that of imposing corporal punishment, of “sell[ing] the indentured
servant along with any debts he owed to someone else,” and of “authoriz[ing] the
marriage of indentured servants.”196
Contrary to what many scholars who encounter them believe, the harsh penalties
targeting “servants” in these codes were not anomalies, Stanziani insists. The author finds
that between 1750 and 1875, in Britain itself, not to speak of the British colonies, the
codes were actively and increasingly enforced, for they served “as a powerful tool in the
hands of master/employers to cope with increasing demand for labour” in an era when
global trades were accelerating and rapidly growing in volume. In this period, there were
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about 10,000 cases of prosecution against laborers who violated the Masters and Servants
acts, with many more settled out of court. The sentences meted out included fines,
docked wages, detention in a house of correction, and, on rare occasions, whipping. The
codes were also unequally enforced, as few masters were prosecuted for violation.
Nevertheless, Stanziani states, though unusual, workers did attempt to sue their masters,
mainly for unpaid wages or unjustified dismissal. These worker-initiated cases pointed
toward new trends that “ultimately changed the balance of power in the labour market,”
Stanziani writes, noting that such a change was first signaled by the decriminalization of
“employment offences” in the Employers and Workmen Act of 1875, fourteen years after
the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire.197 Taken together, these French and
British labor codes were not very different from the restrictions of bondage imposed on
the peasants and the enserfed in Russia during the same period of the seventeenth to the
latter part of the nineteenth century, when these codes were active.
Turning to look at the French and British colonies in the Indian Ocean, Reunion
Island and Mauritius, rather than separating this European “periphery” from Europe’s
“core,” Stanziani argues that the labor contracts of both the empires’ metropolis and the
colonies all involve “actors (masters, servants, day labourers, indentured immigrants)
[who] belonged to one and the same world comprising legal inequalities between
employers … and workers.” There are notable differences, however, as Stanziani
recognizes, since, great as the inequalities were in metropolitan France and Britain, they
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were “far greater in the colonies,” and continued to be so well after the official abolition
of slavery in 1834 for the British Empire, and in 1848 for the French.198
Between 1830 and 1920, in all about a quarter of the two million indentured
servants who were sent to work on tropical plantations, or half a million laborers, arrived
on the islands. They included emigrants from India, and Madagascar, Mozambique, and
China. On Reunion, laborers recruited based on the contracts of engagement began to
work on the island since the 1810s, many of them from India. By 1830, the number of
Reunion’s Indian engagés reached 3,000. In 1847, there were 6.508 engagés on the
island, made up of “Indians, Chinese, Africans, and Creoles.” Between 1849 and 1859,
reflecting the effect of slavery’s abolition in the French colonial empire, the number
Reunion’s engagés shot up to 44,000. In Mauritius, the first engagés arrived in the 1720s,
when the island was a French possession known as Ile de France, and they were brought
from India and other French colonies. After the British takeover of the island in 1810,
indentured servants continued to be transported there, with many of them now coming
from, besides India, Madagascar and East Africa. Between 1834 and 1910, showing the
impact of the British abolition of slavery, Mauritius’s population of indentured servants
grew to 450,000.199
The colonial contracts of engagement and indenture contained similar terms as the
contracts in metropolitan France and Britain, Stanziani shows. Like the metropolitan
labor contracts for agricultural work, those drawn up for the colonies granted workers
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some legal rights, such as the right to challenge employers in court for labor abuses. But,
as Stanziani observes, in practice these rights were “largely ignored.” At the same time,
unlike labor relations in the metropole, the abuses in the colonies were more extreme. To
begin with, the recruitment of laborers was often conducted by force or fraud, and
frequently with the assistance of a wide range of intermediaries who perhaps did not have
in mind the best interest of the recruits. They included “Indian, Arab, and Portuguese
middlemen,” along with “local sultans and village chiefs.”200
Colonial indenture and engagement contracts provided for repatriation. But,
Stanziani observes, “in practice … repatriation was difficult,” particularly since many
workers were compelled to renew their contracts. Between 1850 and 1860s, only one
third of the indentured immigrants sent to Reunion and Mauritius returned home,
compared to the 70 percent repatriation rate for the worker-immigrants to Thailand,
Malaya, and Melanesia. Indentured workers on the islands faced brutal treatment, which
at times led to death. In addition, they were often subjected to withheld wages and
inadequate food provision. The contracts, to discourage robbery and theft, allowed even
minor infractions to be punished severely. Thus, according to Stanziani, as late as the
1860s and 1870s, well after slavery’s abolition in the French and British empires, for a
stolen chicken, some indentured immigrants were sentenced to five years of forced labor,
and, for refusing to turn over their savings to their employers, a number of “Chinese
‘coolies’” were punished by seven years of forced labor. The indenture contracts also
aimed to discourage “the mobility of workers and peasants in the rest of the British
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empire,” notes Stanziani. The French engagé contracts shared this aim. In the case of
Mauritius, as Stanziani states, this intent to limit mobility was strengthened by laws that
were drawn up, as late as the 1870s, against “vagrancy.”201

Conclusion
Regarding serfdom in the Russian Empire, the work of Revisionist Historians
such as Alessandro Stanziani and David Moon, and that of the historians of global labor
history reviewed in this chapter, show the extent to which the interpretation of serfdom
offered by Consensus Historians such as Jerome Blum and comparative labor historians
such as Peter Kolchin may have been flawed. Blum, Kolchin, and other historians who
assert the equivalence of serfdom and slavery, and a vision of serfdom as the diametrical
opposite of “free” labor, may have been misled by the type of documents they used (often
the works of previous historians, rather than archival documents relating to estates
activities and court cases, to which they did not have access because of the Cold War).
More importantly perhaps, they were also shaped by preconceptions about the necessary
link between “unfree” labor and backward societies. Relying on the studies of earlier
scholars, who may themselves have been influenced by a belief in a clear-cut divide
between free and unfree labor, historians like Blum and Kolchin were unable to perceive
the myriad of ways serfdom in Russia, while imposing numerous restrictions on the
enserfed, also allowed room for negotiation and modification over time. In this way
Russian serfdom came close to, and at times, as suggested by the serf memoirs in Chapter
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III, permitted more leeway than the forms of labor encouraged and proliferated in the
“free” and ”advanced” societies of the West. These forms of labor include that of the
indentured servants, represented for instance by tenant farmers, Chinese and Indian
“coolies,” and that of the wage (gage) earner, a figure often taken as the emblem of
“free” labor that was in fact also the model for the French, Indian, Chinese, Malagasy,
and Mozambique engagés.
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